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Abstract 
Smartphones are proliferating into the workplace at an ever-increasing rate, similarly the 
threats that they pose is increasing.  In an era of constant connectivity and availability, 
information is freed up of constraints of time and place.  This research project delves into 
the risks introduced by smartphones, and through multiple cases studies, a maturity 
measurement model is formulated.  The model is based on recommendations from two 
leading information security frameworks, the COBIT 4.1 framework and ISO27002 code of 
practice.  Ultimately, a combination of smartphone specific risks are integrated with key 
control recommendations, in providing a set of key measurable security maturity 
components.   
The subjective opinions of case study respondents are considered a key component in 
achieving a solution.  The solution addresses the concerns of not only policy makers, but 
also the employees subjected to the security policies.  Nurturing security awareness into 
organisational culture through reinforcement and employee acceptance is highlighted in 
this research project. 
Software consultancies can use this model to mitigate risks, while harnessing the potential 
strategic advantages of mobile computing through smartphone devices.  In addition, this 
research project identifies the critical components of a smartphone security solution.  As a 
result, a model is provided for software consultancies due to the intense reliance on 
information within these types of organisations.  The model can be effectively applied to 
any information intensive organisation. 
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1.1 Background 
“A chain is no stronger than its weakest link; but if you show how admirably the last few are 
united; half the world will forget to test the security of the parts which are kept out of 
sight” (Stephen, 1868, p. 295).  Stephen suggests that a chain’s strongest links often 
overshadow its greatest vulnerabilities.  These vulnerabilities are the hidden weaker links in 
the chain.  They are the issues in the chain that one prefers not to have to deal with, instead 
focusing on the more visible ones.  The result, as concluded by Stephen, is that one is often 
under a false pretence that the strength of a chain is as strong as the strongest linkages, as 
these are the ones most visible. 
Pironti (2005) places this into the mobile information security perspective, by highlighting 
how vitally important it is to remember that mobile security solutions are not stand-alone 
phenomena.  Pironti indicates that when introduced, they need to become an integral part 
of the enterprise information infrastructure.  An organisation’s mobile security solution 
effectively becomes a link in its information security chain.  This follows, that a weak mobile 
security solution will compromise the strength of the entire chain.   
Identifying the weaknesses in this chain and replacing them with strengthened links, 
increases the strength of that entire chain.  Many chief information officers (CIOs) are aware 
of the possibility of increased risk through the introduction of mobile computing, and that 
this risk could potentially weaken the existing chain of security currently operating in an 
organisation.  Sacco (2008) highlights a study conducted by the Computing Technology 
Industry Association (CompTIA) which found that although nearly 80% of respondent 
organisations allowed mobile workers access to data on their corporate networks, less than 
a third had actually implemented security awareness training for those workers. 
Software consultancy firms deal with the design and development of custom software 
solutions.  These solutions are conceived from the knowledge within the software 
consultancy firm.  Isaksen (2004) describes software consultancy as a knowledge intensive 
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industry.  He points out that software consultancies contain large numbers of workers with 
tertiary education.  Workers dealing with knowledge need access to information.  That 
information is the main asset of the organisation.  It is vitally important for software 
consultancy organisations to protect their information assets while maintaining its 
accessibility.  This is confirmed by Isaksen (2004, p. 1160) who states that “knowledge 
entrepreneurs are seen to be among the most widely connected or mobile people, always 
on the move”.  This places the smartphone in an excellent position to serve the 
requirements of software consultancy organisations.  This however requires a level of 
security control for smartphone adoption. 
In some cases, it might be that mobile computing would seem to pose too big a risk for 
organisational consideration.  However, due to the vast assortment of mobile computing 
devices available, organisations would be foolish in thinking that they could avoid the issue 
completely.  Others simply ignore or do not understand the risks.  The associated risks 
become even larger, as mobile computing moves from the realm of the enthusiast, to the 
ordinary office worker.  Sharma (2007) confirms this trend by pointing out that it is no 
longer just executives who carry these devices.  Specifically smartphone usage is growing 
within the ranks of both middle management and staff workers.   
This trend is being driven by an evolution of the mobile phone into the smartphone, and this 
evolution is in turn being driven by a rapidly dropping unit cost.  Best (2006, p. 1) provides 
the following Gartner definition of a smartphone: “A large-screen, data-centric, handheld 
device designed to offer complete phone functions whilst simultaneously functioning as a 
personal digital assistant (PDA)”.  According to a study by In-Stat, global Smartphone sales 
are predicted to increase by 30% year on year, for the next five years (Reardon, 2007).  
Smartphone usage is filling a gap that PDA devices failed to achieve.  Unfortunately as 
pointed out by Pironti (2005, p. 31), smartphones are emerging as “primary points of 
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vulnerability in the new wireless enterprise”, with their ability to not only send and receive 
information, but to store it as well.  
Smartphone usage introduces a unique set of risks into a software consultancy 
organisation’s information security.  Pironti (2005) emphasises that these new risks 
emanate from a completely different direction to traditional security, which has primarily 
focused on protecting just the network.  Existing traditional security mechanisms would 
need to be both extended and refined.  This would allow one to accommodate for the 
added security risks introduced by the use of smartphones.  In order to extend and refine 
existing security mechanisms, organisations need to be able to measure the existing security 
against the accepted minimum requirements needed to satisfy corporate governance 
requirements.  Pironti (2005, p. 31) provides the following steps, which one should consider 
when measuring mobile security risks and defining a solution for these risks:  
 Perform a thorough threat and vulnerability assessment of the devices that the 
enterprise will support, along with the business processes to which those devices 
align.  This would help to analyse and quantify the risk that these mobile devices 
pose. 
 Implement appropriate policies and security controls so that employees can use 
their mobile devices without harming the enterprise. 
 Classify data (according to business importance) in order to mitigate some mobile 
computing threats and ensure security and integrity of that data. 
 Establish a policy laying out the rules, communicate this to the user community and 
establish the logical and physical controls required to enforce the policy. 
However, measuring these risks and defining appropriate solutions can be a difficult task 
without some guidelines.  Sweren (2006) explains that the base or the foundation of an 
information security program needs acceptance in the information security industry, while 
remaining applicable to an organisation’s environment.  For this reason, recognised 
frameworks, standards and toolsets, such as the COBIT 4.1 framework and the ISO27002 
 
5 
 
(formally known as the ISO17799) code of practice for information security management, 
exist to assist with the implementation of enterprise security solutions.  These frameworks 
have been developed by industry experts and have proven capability in improving 
enterprise security where applied. 
COBIT 4.1 is self-defined as, “a framework and supporting toolset that allows managers to 
bridge the gap with respect to control requirements, technical issues and business risks, and 
communicate that level of control to stakeholders” (IT Governance Institute, 2007b, p. 8).  
Using COBIT 4.1, clear policies and good practices can be implemented throughout the 
enterprise.  The governance-focused approach of COBIT 4.1 centres on the management 
and control of information.  Complementing this, the ISO27002 provides a comprehensive 
and clear set of standards based controls to reduce and mitigate security risks.  Garbani, 
Koetzle, and Powell (2006) indicate that the critical success factors, and key performance 
indicators of COBIT 4.1, together with the security processes and controls of ISO27002 are 
highly complementary.  They continue by adding that COBIT 4.1 and ISO27002 also provide 
guidance, key indicators, and controls for the definition of service-level agreements, 
capacity planning, availability management, and business continuity (Garbani, Koetzle, & 
Powell, 2006). 
Sweren (2006, p. 1) points out the benefits of aligning enterprise solutions to frameworks 
such as these: 
 The organisation does not have to maintain the specific content of that 
framework, as this is the responsibility of the control group responsible for each 
framework. 
 These frameworks have been reviewed and vetted by more people of knowledge 
than are available in the organisation. 
 Finally, it is something the organisation’s management and board of directors 
can trust and recognise without the requisite knowledge of information security 
jargon. 
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In summary, software consultancy organisations require a holistic end-to-end security chain.  
This chain requires continuous monitoring for weaknesses of any links in the chain.  Any 
weaknesses compromise the entire chain of security.  Formulating a security strategy to 
encapsulate the entire chain would prove overwhelming for a single organisation or 
department.  Instead, basing and aligning one’s security strategy to trusted frameworks 
would result in a more effective security chain, end-to-end.  Finally, establishing controls to 
monitor and measure each portion or link in the chain would ensure prolonged integrity of 
the entire chain.   
Furlong, vice president of security and mobile connectivity at Nokia, states that, “as your 
employees become more mobile, the security policies that you implement need to adapt to 
the mobile market” (Lim, 2007, p. 12).  Furlong is suggesting that existing security is not 
suitable for mobile security use.  Sharma (2007) concurs, that while it is straightforward for 
IT departments to manage business applications that reside on laptops or PCs, conducting 
the same on mobile handsets provides far greater challenges.  He explains that mobile 
devices and applications run on many different operating systems and through a wide range 
of access technologies.  Pironti (2005) agrees that the security risks of smartphone devices 
are complex, requiring the establishment of controls that enable enforcement of a risk 
mitigating policy.   
As noted previously, these new controls cannot be stand-alone phenomena, but must form 
part of the greater security chain.  In order to establish the security required, existing risks 
need to be measured and mitigated.  Measuring risk is the process of defining the risks and 
identifying their probabilities of occurrence.  Mitigating risks is the process of identifying the 
controls available to reduce them. 
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Management needs to define a security model based on recognised security frameworks, 
standards and toolsets.  This security model needs to be able to measure existing security.  
The model must also provide the company with recommendations on where it needs to be.  
Any new security requirements must be accepted and adopted by management, IT, and of 
course employees.  Finally, the security model needs to be both transparent and adaptable 
to a multitude of different smartphone devices that it will be required to secure.  
1.1.1 Smartphone security solutions 
The majority of literature focuses on the technical nature of smartphone security, and 
include issues of encryption, network protocols, communication protocols, operating 
system configurations and many other technical aspects.  However, technical topics are 
outside the scope of this research.   
Dunn (2007) mentions that smartphone security is still a largely neglected area. McCall 
(2006) agrees suggesting that although smartphones are used increasingly as organisational 
productivity tools, not all corporate network administrators have plans to safeguard the 
corporate data carried on these devices.  Sharma (2007) adds that CIOs fail to consider 
smartphone devices in terms of their security and management strategies.  The evidence 
suggests therefore that the security industry is currently paying too little attention to a 
technology that is real, and already becoming a major threat. 
1.1.2  The COBIT 4.1 framework 
IT governance integrates and institutionalises good practices to ensure that the 
organisation’s IT supports the business objectives.  The COBIT 4.1 framework meets this 
definition by “providing good practices across a domain and process framework which 
presents activities in a manageable and logical structure” (IT Governance Institute, 2007b, p. 
5). The COBIT 4.1 framework contributes to the needs of delivering against business 
requirements through the following: 
 Making a link to the business requirements; 
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 Organising IT activities into a generally accepted process model; 
 Identifying the major IT resources to be leveraged; 
 Defining the management control objectives to be considered (IT Governance 
Institute, 2007b, p. 5). 
The process focus of COBIT 4.1 is illustrated by a process model, that subdivides IT in to four 
domains and 34 processes in line with the responsibility areas of plan, build, run and 
monitor.  This end-to-end approach to the IT process provides management with a core 
foundation centred on solid accepted guidelines.  The IT Governance Institute indicates that 
enterprises need an objective measure of where they are and where improvement is 
required.  “Organisations need to implement a management tool kit to monitor this 
improvement (IT Governance Institute, 2007b, p. 6)”.   
COBIT 4.1 provides for the assessment of process capability, based on maturity models, 
which help to identify gaps in capability and then be demonstrated to management.  Action 
plans can then be developed to bring these processes up to the desired capability target 
levels.  This makes COBIT 4.1 perfect for assessing the gaps existing between the currently 
implemented security solution, and a COBIT 4.1 based smartphone security solution.  COBIT 
4.1 defines IT activities in a generic process model within four domains (IT Governance 
Institute, 2007b, p. 12).  The four domains defined by COBIT 4.1 are Plan and Organise, 
Acquire and Implement, Deliver and Support, and Monitor and Evaluate.  COBIT 4.1 explains 
that these domains map to I.T.’s traditional responsibility areas of plan, build, run and 
monitor.  The COBIT 4.1 framework is especially well suited as it incorporates a common 
language for all sectors of the business involved in IT.  
This research project will focus primarily on the Plan and Organise domain of the COBIT 4.1 
framework.  This is because the scope of this research project does not include the 
implementation aspects of a smartphone security solution.  The IT Governance Institute 
describes the domain as one that covers strategy and tactics, and concerns the identification 
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of the way IT can best contribute to the achievement of the business objectives (IT 
Governance Institute, 2007b, p. 12).  The IT Governance Institute further indicates that the 
realisation of the strategic visions needs to be planned, communicated and managed for 
different perspectives.  Planning and organising provides the foundation for implementing a 
smartphone solution into the organisation.  The proposed solution will cover the following 
key requirements:  
 Aligning the smartphone business strategy with the overall business strategy; 
 Plan for optimum use of enterprise resources; 
 Providing a means for everyone in the organisation to understand the objectives of a 
smartphone security solution; 
 Providing an understanding of the risks and their management; 
 Determining whether the quality of the smartphone solution is appropriate for the 
business needs. 
This study will assess each of the processes within the COBIT 4.1 frameworks.  The IT 
Governance Institute recommends the use of maturity models, in order to establish how 
well IT is being managed, and what can be done to reach adequate maturity levels (IT 
Governance Institute, 2007b, p. 17).  By using maturity models based on each of COBIT’s 
processes, organisations are able to measure where the enterprise is situated in relation to 
the required levels of a smartphone security solution.  Then the organisation can efficiently 
decide the direction in which it needs to move, and measure the progress made towards 
this goal. 
1.1.3  The ISO27002 standards 
The ISO27002 standards derive security requirements based on assessing risks to the 
organisation and by adhering to legal, statutory, regulatory and contractual requirements 
and a particular set of principles, objectives and business requirements (Standards South 
Africa, 2005). The international standard establishes guidelines and general principles for 
initiating, implementing and maintaining and improving information security management 
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in an organisation (Standards South Africa, 2005).  The control objectives and controls in 
ISO27002 are implemented to meet the requirements identified by a risk assessment 
(Standards South Africa, 2005).  This makes the ISO27002 standard a perfect complement to 
the risk analysis performed using the COBIT 4.1 framework.  The ISO27002 provides a 
common basis and a practical guideline for developing organisational security standards.  
This includes effective security management practices to help build confidence in inter-
organisational activities. 
“The standard contains 11 security control clauses, collectively containing a total of 39 main 
security categories, and one introductory clause introducing risk assessment and treatment” 
(Standards South Africa, 2005, p. 4).  This research project will also make use of existing 
COBIT 4.1 and ISO27002 mapping documents. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
With the mass consumerism of the smartphone being driven aggressively by leading IT 
companies such as Apple, HTC and Microsoft, along with the continuous release of feature 
heavy handsets by manufacturers such as Nokia, Sony Ericsson, LG, HTC and others, many 
organisations are seeing the proliferation of smartphones into the workplace.  Predictions 
have estimated this number to be as high as 30% globally year on year, for at least the next 
five years (Reardon, 2007).  Yeo (2008) quotes a Gartner prediction that by 2012 half of all 
mobile employees will switch from laptops to more powerful and compact devices such as 
smartphones.  Software consultancy organisations that do not prepare for the introduction 
of smartphones into their infrastructure will suffer the consequences of security 
vulnerabilities, and threats which exploit these vulnerabilities, being introduced by these 
devices.  Many of these organisations do not have a concise and eligible model to measure 
and identify gaps or vulnerabilities existing between their current security solutions and an 
adequate smartphone security solution.   
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1.3 Research question 
How can a software consultancy organisation measure the vulnerability gaps that exist 
between its existing security solution, and a smartphone security solution so it conforms to 
both the COBIT 4.1 framework and the ISO27002 standards? 
A software consultancy organisation’s existing security solution requires adjustment in order 
to encompass smartphone security requirements.  This would include an analysis of the 
requirements of a smartphone security solution for a software consultancy organisation.  
These requirements when measured against an existing security solution will identify the 
vulnerabilities that exist in the security solution as it is.  The IT Governance Institute (2007b) 
states that management is constantly on the lookout for benchmarking and self-assessment 
tools.  They indicate the need for a tool to measure where the organisation is, where it 
needs to go, and how to measure progress against this goal.  Vulnerabilities are the gaps 
between the existing security solution as it is, and the direction it needs to take.  Figure 1 
illustrates the gap between the existing security solution (right column) and a security 
solution that includes smartphone security component (left column). 
 
 
Figure 1 - The vulnerability gap 
Security solution including 
smartphone security.
Security solution as it is 
currently.
Smartphone security
Existing securityA A 
The area above column A is the vulnerability gap 
between the existing security solution as it is, and 
a security solution that includes smartphone 
security (where it needs to go). 
B 
More Secure 
Less Secure 
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New controls and policies must be defined to minimise gaps once they are identified.  
Measuring the requirements of a new solution can be achieved by basing the analysis of the 
measurements on existing accepted frameworks and standards.  Therefore, the COBIT 4.1 
framework and ISO27002 standards have been selected, due to their recognition and 
acceptance by industry experts.  This research project will define a model as the tool to 
identify the requirements of a software consultancy organisation’s existing security solution.  
This solution will include smartphone security components and will aim to satisfy the 
security requirements of smartphone adoption in these organisations.  The model will 
identify the gaps that exist between a software consultancy organisation’s existing security 
model as it is, and that of a smartphone security model based on the COBIT 4.1 framework 
and ISO27002 standards.  Using this model, organisations will be able to identify the 
vulnerabilities illustrated above in Figure 1 as area ‘B’. 
1.4 Sub-questions 
What are the specific security requirements of smartphones in software consultancy 
organisations? 
Software consultancy organisations, by their nature tend to have a significant mix of 
technology, and technology professionals; an extra level of vigilance to maintain 
smartphone security amongst skilled employees using advanced smartphone technologies, 
is required.  Seventeen measurable components are identified in this research project in 
response to this research sub-question. 
What components from the COBIT 4.1 framework and ISO27002 standards are most 
significant to a security solution that includes smartphone security? 
The COBIT 4.1 framework and ISO27002 standards consist of a number of components 
aimed at a broad technology spread.  Identifying the components most relevant to 
smartphone security is crucial in providing a solution that is both concise and focused.  This 
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research highlights these components, and integrates them with other key smartphone 
security requirements in producing a solution to this research sub-question. 
How can the gap between an existing security solution and one that conforms to both COBIT 
4.1 and ISO27002 be measured in a software consultancy organisation? 
Identifying a way to measure the gaps between an existing solution, and one that conforms 
to the COBIT 4.1 framework and ISO27002 standards, is a core focus of this research project.  
It will provide a software consultancy organisation with a starting point for the 
implementation of smartphone security, in a way that will not hamper its inception, or 
compromise existing security solutions.  Measuring these gaps in a software consultancy 
organisation will present a unique set of requirements, risks as well as other factors to 
consider.  A maturity model with adjustable targets is provided by this research project as a 
response to this sub-question. 
1.5 Objectives of the study 
The objective of this research project was to define a model.  This model was expected to 
provide clear and concise guidelines to measure a software consultancy organisation’s 
existing security solution against a solution based on the COBIT 4.1 framework and 
supported by the ISO27002 standards.  The model solution will include a smartphone 
security component as a core requirement.  Using this model, software consultancy 
organisations will be able identify vulnerabilities in their existing internal security controls.  
Consequently, goals can be established to reduce and remove these vulnerabilities.  
Maturity models can then be used to measure the progress made by these organisations in 
reducing or removing the weaknesses in their system of internal controls.  
Brotby (2007, p. 2) states that “it is probable that recognising the value of an organisation’s 
intangible assets and integrating information security governance with business strategy will 
be increasingly critical to ongoing corporate success”.  Thus, Brotby emphasises the 
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increasing importance of information as an intangible organisational asset.  Protecting this 
asset is as important as the tangible assets of an organisation.  Thus, the primary objective 
of securing smartphone usage is that of securing information assets. 
1.6 Significance of the study 
Dunn (2007) states that while personal smartphones have added complexity to the ongoing 
development of the IT landscape, smartphone security is still a largely neglected area.  It is 
alarming to consider the potential for damage by both malicious and unintentionally 
motivated incidents because of users, who may or may not even be aware of the fact that 
their smartphone device is insecure.  In fact the centre for public service innovation in South 
Africa, listed ‘institutional readiness’ as one of the leading factors to consider when 
implementing a mobile computing solution.  They state that the real issue is one of 
management, rather than of technology (The centre for public service innovation, 2003, p. 
28).   
Kooser (2007) explains that when it comes to mobile security, prevention is definitely the 
key.  According to Pironti (2005), users fail to appreciate the sensitivity of storing data on 
these devices.  In addition, they do not understand how to secure data on these devices and 
even consider security mechanisms to be an inconvenience not worth having (Pironti, 2005).  
Dunn (2007) indicates that policies, although restrictive of an employee’s use of a certain 
mobile computing platform, would be effective in securing data.  However, these policies 
may be difficult to enforce remotely.  In other words, acceptance from the end user of these 
policies is essential.  Using the model from this research project, software consultancy 
organisations will now have a starting point from which they will be able to measure the 
success of their preparation for a smartphone security solution. 
Following this study, these organisations will be able to design and implement a security 
solution and supporting policies.  This solution must be specifically directed at closing the 
gaps identified within an organisation’s existing security solution.  This will assist in defining 
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the expansion of the existing security solution to accommodate for the requirements of a 
COBIT 4.1 and ISO27002 compatible solution.  These solutions will be grounded on secure 
policies, which are in turn founded on an accepted security framework utilising accepted 
standards. 
1.7 Research design 
Congdon and Dunham (1999) point out that the probability of a successful project is greatly 
enhanced when the beginning is correctly defined as a precise statement of goals and 
justification.  The research design describes the elements of the research and the 
methodology to be followed. 
1.8 Research paradigm 
The paradigm selected for this research project is interpretive using qualitative research 
methods.  Myers (1997, p. 1) explains that, “qualitative research methods were developed 
in the social sciences to enable researchers to study social and cultural phenomena.  
Examples of qualitative methods are action research, case study research and 
ethnography”.  This approach is conducive in understanding the social constraints and 
opportunities in adapting towards a controlled smartphone security solution.  Greenhalgh 
and Taylor (1997) add that qualitative research attempts to address and interpret 
phenomena in terms of the meanings that people bring to them.  The underlying 
epistemology on which this research project is based, is that of an interpretive approach, 
where knowledge will be interpreted based on the researcher’s experience.  Myers (1997) 
states that interpretive studies are generally aimed towards understanding the phenomena, 
through the meanings that people assign to them.   
Neill (2006) indicates that the interpretive approach allows one to gain insights through 
discovering meanings.  Myers (1997) adds that interpretive methods of research in IS, are 
aimed at producing an understanding of the context of an information system, the process 
which itself influences that context.  Gaining a subjective insight of the holistic impact of 
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smartphone security in the context of an existing security solution can be achieved using an 
interpretive approach.  Neill (2006, p. 1) states that “a major strength of the qualitative 
approach is the depth to which explorations are conducted and descriptions are written, 
usually resulting in sufficient details for the reader to grasp the idiosyncrasies of the 
situation”.  He suggests that research should provide both a rich and deep exploration of a 
particular subject.   
Collis and Hussey (2003) indicate that combining research strategies would allow one to 
take a broader view of the research problem.  They suggest that few research projects 
would be compiled using one research paradigm.  Due to the slant of this research project 
towards the managerial aspects of smartphone security, qualitative research methods will 
be predominant. However, analysis of these results will be quantified using quantitative 
methods in order to identify any possible trends.  Combining qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies will allow the researcher to obtain a deeper understanding of the results.  
Collis and Hussey (2003) refer to this as research triangulation.   
Figure 2 illustrates the extremes of the pure interpretive approach and the pure positivist 
approach. 
 
 
 
 
  
  As one moves between the extremes the composition of the research consists of less of 
one approach and more of the other.  This research project will be positioned as indicated 
towards the interpretive approach. 
Figure 2 - Research methodology positioning 
This research project will consist of elements 
from both approaches.  It will however be 
positioned towards the interpretive approach. 
Positivist 
                                                      Interpretive 
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1.9 Research methodology 
This research project will culminate in the development of a model.  Olivier (2004, p. 45) 
explains that a model should “capture the essential aspects of a system or process, while it 
ignores the non-essential aspects”.  The model will be based on the following characteristics 
as defined by Olivier (2004, p. 49):  
 It should be simple to understand; 
 It should be comprehensive; 
 It should be able to be applied generally; 
 It should fit the problem exactly; 
 It should be clear. 
1.10 Data collection 
Myers (1997) provides us with the following examples of qualitative data sources: 
observation and participant observation (fieldwork), interviews and questionnaires, 
documents and texts, and the researcher’s impressions and reactions.  The research 
instrument used to collect the data required for the model will be a questionnaire.  
Components will be selected from the COBIT 4.1 framework for inclusion in the 
questionnaire.  The researcher will select the components according to their role in the 
COBIT 4.1 framework.  Questions will be organised into managerial and operational 
smartphone security requirements.  This will provide the researcher with subjective and 
quantifiable results, of the subjective opinions of the respondents of each questionnaire.   
The questionnaire will be distributed to voluntary participating software consultancy 
organisations.  The questionnaires will need to be completed by employees at various 
positions and in levels within the organisations.  The questions will range from the 
operational to managerial levels.  Questions will be structured in such a way as to be as 
subjective as possible.  The questions will achieve subjectivity by utilising scaled response 
options.  The respondents will be asked to indicate the level to which they consider the 
question statements importance to be, to smartphone security at their organisation.  This 
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question structure is similar to that of the maturity model of the COBIT 4.1 framework.  This 
approach allows each respondent to subjectively evaluate a similar set of structured 
question statements that can easily be quantified. 
1.11 Data analysis 
The data will be analysed using a spreadsheet tool for trends and patterns amongst the 
respondents.  Graphs and charts will be generated in order to present trends graphically.  All 
trends and patterns identified will then be incorporated into the development of the model. 
1.12 Delimitation of the study 
This research project is focused on providing a model.  The model will assist in measuring 
software consultancy organisations security readiness for the adoption of smartphones.  
The primary focus will not contain technical implementation instructions.  Instead, the 
solution will emphasise the requirements at a higher managerial level.  Furthermore, the 
outcome will not provide an estimated period or budget for implementation of its 
recommendations, as these will depend on each individual organisation’s circumstance. 
The specific technical details of each smartphone device will not be considered for this 
research project.  Integrating smartphone security into a software consultancy 
organisation’s existing system of internal controls is the core focus of the model developed 
in this study.  This model will be constructed from the specific smartphone security 
requirements of software consultancy organisations. 
This research project will adopt a neutral stance regarding each device, device model, 
device manufacturer and device operating system.  Software consultancy organisations will 
be able to use the outcome of this research project to make an informed managerial 
decision.  This research project provides security solutions for devices that fall under the 
description of a smartphone.  This description will be clearly defined in the research project.  
The results of this study would need to be reassessed for any possible implementation or 
adoption in other industries, organisations or government departments.  
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1.13 Outline of the research project 
The research project begins with an introductory chapter.  Chapter 1 provides a brief 
introduction to the topic and the problem within the context of a software consultancy 
organisation.  Chapter 1 also provides an overview of the objectives, research methodology 
and delimitation of the study.  Chapter 1 concludes with details of the outline of the 
research project. 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 provide the literature review section of this research project.  Chapter 2 
explains the importance of organisational information security.  The role of information as 
an organisational asset is established, followed by the importance of an information security 
culture.  Software consultancies and information workers are discussed in detail in Chapter 
2. 
Chapter 3 introduces the smartphone and establishes a definition for this research paper.  
Smartphone security weaknesses are defined and explored in detail.  Finally, Chapter 3 
concludes by contrasting the risk management and mitigation measures of smartphones 
against more traditional fixed computing devices.  In Chapter 4, two industry leading 
information security frameworks are analysed as a basis from which the research model can 
be developed.  These frameworks are then analysed to identify the components that are 
relevant to the requirements of smartphone security. 
The research methodology, empirical framework and case study are discussed in Chapter 5.  
The chapter provides both the philosophical assumption and method of study used to 
address the research problem.  The empirical framework and resulting case study are 
detailed in Chapter 5, including details of the primary and secondary data used. 
In Chapter 6 the findings of the research project are presented, followed by the 
recommendations.  A model is presented in this chapter in response to the research 
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problem.  Chapter 6 concludes with a detailed explanation of the recommendations and 
model. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this research project by providing an explanation of the 
contributions made by this research, an evaluation of the research outcomes and directions 
for future research.   
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2.1 Introduction 
Information, and more importantly the security thereof, is the ultimate goal of smartphone 
security.  Many organisations focus security efforts solely on the protection of physical 
assets.  Certainly in the information technology (IT) department, hardware ranks as one of 
the most expensive investments an organisation makes.  However, hardware investments 
are only there to serve information requirements.  
Organisations need to recognise the importance of their information.  They need to 
emphasise its protection, as the most important of all the assets of the IT department.  
Employees must be made aware, through education, of the importance of information.  
Section 2.2 introduces the concept of information as an asset, and organisational 
information security cultures.  This becomes vital as we enter into an information centric 
age of business.  Many companies have failed to recognise the increasing importance of 
information in their daily business procedures. 
Section 2.3 explains the importance of information security, within the context of the 
organisation.  Understanding the importance of information security ensures that a culture 
of information awareness, and acceptance, prevails.  This is provided in section 2.4, which 
also covers the importance of ensuring that employees are at the centre of all efforts to 
maintain information security.  
Section 2.5 of this chapter introduces the software consultancy organisational context of 
this research project, and provides an explanation of the reason that this context was 
chosen.  Focus will be shifted to employees in section 2.6, only this time to understand the 
concept of an information workforce, and how information is driving a new era of 
information workers.  Section 2.7 details the importance of acceptance towards information 
security by all employees.  Finally, section 2.8 provides insight into the steps that security 
stakeholders can take to establish a security control mechanism, through a stringent 
awareness culture and widespread policy adoption.  
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Doherty and Fulford (2006) describe information as the lifeblood of an organisation.  
Information is redefining the way that we do business; in turn, we must redefine the way 
that we use and protect information.  Organisational information security is not a new 
concept.  It has existed in some form as long as business itself.  However, technological 
advancements have completely changed both the importance, and definition of 
organisational information security. Finally, the term information, as provided in this 
chapter, refers to all forms of information such as data and knowledge. 
2.2 Information as an asset 
The protection of organisations’ information assets is a complex task.  Securing information 
means securing the repositories it is stored in, the channels it moves across and the systems 
that process it.  Information is being exposed to an ever-growing number of threats and 
vulnerabilities (Standards South Africa, 2005).  Information assets introduce many risks and 
complexities.  An Information asset can comprise of a vast assortment of different forms 
and factors.  Musaji (2006) indicates that information assets can include systems, data, 
images, text and voice.  These assets are contained within the internal systems that support 
the company’s business activities. 
Kruger and Kearny (2008) point out that companies will often spend huge amounts of 
money and time on implementing technical solutions, while the human factor in 
information security receives relatively less attention.  Protecting information is the 
responsibility of all employees, and not just those at managerial levels.   
Employees do not tend to take as much care of information assets, as they would with a 
physical asset.  They are often unable to place value on intangible concepts such as 
information.  Kruger and Kearny argue that it is therefore important for human activities to 
be linked to security issues through the involvement of humans in information security.  In 
order for security to become a priority concept, people need to be at the centre of its 
implementation.  
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As with physical assets, employees should be made aware of the value of the information 
that they might take for granted in an organisation.  Information is an asset to the company.  
Senior management are ultimately responsible for educating all employees on the 
importance of protecting information, as if it were a regular physical asset.  Strict policies 
and guidelines need to be identified and implemented.  These must be introduced in such a 
way, as to not restrict the flow of information within the organisation.  Businesses thrive on 
information.  Restricting the flow of information would prove detrimental to the business 
and frustrating for employees.   
There is no definitive description or example of an information asset.  The value of an 
information asset can change depending on the context within which it exists.  Often 
information is what uniquely positions most companies from their competitors.  Today 
businesses are operating in markets that move more quickly than ever before; and 
information becomes key to detecting or predicting market movements.  Companies that 
can harness their information to help them to react faster to these movements can achieve 
winning results.  Ensuring that information is readily available and accurate, while at the 
same time remaining secure, is key to the importance of information security. 
2.3 The importance of information security 
The importance of protecting an organisation’s security exists for a number of reasons.  
Organisational information that is compromised, stolen or lost can harm more than just the 
organisation.  If an organisation maintains confidential third party information, the 
responsibility remains with the organisation to protect that information.  Loss of 
information could result in damages to the organisation itself or third parties.  This may be 
in the form of damaged reputations, loss of confidential information and trade secrets, or in 
extreme cases may result in threats to human life. 
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Information security threats can result from a number of different sources, and take many 
forms.  Standards South Africa (2005) provides the following list of possible forms of threats 
to an organisation’s information security:  
 Computer-assisted fraud 
 Espionage 
 Sabotage 
 Vandalism 
 Fire or flood 
 Malicious code 
 Computer hacking 
 Denial of service attacks 
These, and other forms of threats are not only on the increase, but according to Standards 
South Africa (2005), are becoming both more sophisticated and ambitious.  These security 
threats exist from both inside and outside the organisation, and they can be classified as 
intentional or accidental (Kritzinger & Smith, 2008).   
Organisations however have traditionally focused on applying security to control external 
threats to information security.  Often organisations are only seeking to mitigate internal 
malicious intentions when implementing internal controls.  Table 1 indicates the primary 
and secondary focus areas for a majority of organisations.  
Table 1 - Threat source security focus 
 Internal Threats External Threats 
Malicious Intentions Secondary Focus Primary Focus 
Accidental/Unintentional Actions Minimum Focus Secondary Focus 
As indicated in the above table, the primary focus of traditional security solutions has been 
against the malicious actions of external threats such as hackers or viruses.  Secondary focus 
is aimed at restricting external accidental information security breaches and malicious 
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internal breaches.  Lastly, internal unintentional or accidental information security breaches 
traditionally receive relatively less or no attention.   
Liginlal, Sim, and Khansa (2009) state that human error, as a cause of data breaches, has 
received very little attention from researchers.  They found that internal accidental threats, 
such as human error, actually accounted for a large percentage of incidents over a period 
from January 2005 to June 2008 (Liginlal, Sim, & Khansa, 2009).  This is especially true in 
smaller organisations that traditionally operate under the notion of absolute trust in 
employees.  A trust that views employees as always acting within the best interest of the 
company.   
Addressing each of these areas equally is imperative in ensuring that the security chain 
contains no weak links at any point.  The traditional mindset of information security, as 
being a defence strategy from outside offenses, need to be updated or redefined to an 
offensive strategy on security weaknesses.  This is especially important for smartphone 
security.  Still in its infancy, smartphone security is at a higher risk from both internal and 
external threats, than more mature computing platforms. 
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The CIA triad (or triangle) is a widely known and accepted conceptualisation of the pillars of 
information security. 
 
Figure 3 - The CIA Triad (Triangle) 
 The triangle indicates that information security can be broken up into three core 
components (the pillars): confidentiality, integrity and availability.  The first component, 
confidentiality, centres on the restriction of access to information.  Only authorised 
individuals should have access to confidential information.  Confidentiality is a critical 
component of information security.   
The restriction of access to information ensures that only authorised and authenticated 
users are able to view restricted organisational information.  Authenticated users are users 
that are permitted to access the organisations information systems.  Authorised users are 
authenticated users with the permission to access the information contained within these 
systems.   
Confidentiality measures must be implemented across all mediums of information storage, 
communication and processing for true restriction of access to be enforced.  Enforcing 
confidentiality is a complex task involving multiple technologies and communication 
methods.  Without confidentiality, the integrity of information could become compromised.   
Confidentiality
Integrity
Information
security
Availablity
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Smartphones present confidentiality issues by virtue of their mobility.  Confirming the 
identity of a smartphone user attempting to connect via an independent service provider, 
requires a heightened depth of security. 
The second component in the CIA triangle, Integrity, is based upon the need for information 
to be accurate, authentic and trustworthy.  Digital information can be easily modified.  
Modified information no longer provides the authenticity of its original state.  Thus 
preventing the undesired modification of information is paramount to protecting its 
integrity.   
Information must be maintained in the format that is best suited to the business context 
that it supports.  Malicious or accidental modifications might result in information that is no 
longer able to provide a competitive advantage to the employees that use it.  Integrity can 
be better protected by ensuring that the confidentiality of the information is maintained.  
Ensuring integrity, such as enforcing confidentiality, is complicated by the various forms of 
information available.  In addition, smartphones often communicate this information on 
untrustworthy network channels.  Untrustworthy channels are digital networks where the 
organisation does not have any control over the security controls, policies or 
implementation.  Ensuring the integrity of the information received and sent on these 
networks is paramount to achieving adequate information security. 
The final component, availability, indicates the importance of being able to access 
information when and where it is required.  This component is often neglected by 
organisations that do not invest enough in technology capable of extending the access 
employees have to information.  Availability, if adequately addressed, can provide a 
competitive advantage for employees.  However often in order to achieve adequate levels 
of availability, organisations must make extensive use of untrustworthy networks.   
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When an employee is connected to a third party untrustworthy network, the organisation 
has limited to no control over the security deployed across that network.  Adequate security 
for an organisation’s information should provide mitigation strategies for untrustworthy 
communication channels.  However, restricting access to these networks will reduce or halt 
productivity gains possible through smartphone use. 
All information needs securing in such a way as to address each of the components of the 
triangle.  Organisations that fail to address each of these components, will compromise the 
value of the information to the organisation.  This can result in stagnation of the innovation 
and responsiveness of the organisation to its markets, suppliers and consumers.  Al Aboodi 
(2006) adds that demonstrated information security, can add real value to an organisation, 
by contributing to the integration with trading partners, maintaining closer customer 
relationships, improving competitive advantage and protecting reputations.   
Information security is vitally important.  Employees should receive training and education 
in order to both understand and support this sentiment.  To achieve the objectives of 
information security, an organisation-wide culture of information security must be nurtured.  
One in which all employees are tuned into the threats to their organisations information 
confidentiality, integrity and availability.  One in which all employees are provided with the 
tools and knowledge to act on these threats accordingly.  Organisational culture is discussed 
in the following section.  Defining and installing this culture is the responsibility of 
organisational leaders and policy makers. 
2.4 Establishing an information security culture 
The most secure information security solution would be futile without the support of the 
employees with whom it is tasked to protect.  Olzak (2006), states that one of the most 
important pieces of an effective information security solution is employee awareness.  New 
employees might not be aware of existing policies, or the need for these information 
security policies.  It becomes vitally important that employees are aware of such programs 
 
30 
 
at the initiation of their employment with the organisation.  Existing employees require 
constant reminding, using both direct and indirect means of reinforcing that awareness.   
Ruighaver, Maynard, and Chang (2007) found that there was no evidence that employees 
are intrinsically motivated to adopt secure practices.  They argue that employees need to 
learn that security controls are necessary and useful, in order to discourage them from 
attempting to bypass these controls.  Thus, employee motivation needs to be developed.  
Motivational rewards, such as money and recognition, can also be used to increase levels of 
participation. 
Albrechtsen (2007) explains that a user’s view on information security is created by several 
interlocking organisational, technological and individual factors.  Any changes to the 
environment in which employees are familiar with, tends to be highly resisted.  Thus 
introducing any policy of information security can be met with resistance from some 
employees.  Unfortunately, security changes are usually forced on organisations, as they 
must adapt to external fluctuations in markets, technology and legislation. 
Employees might not be aware of how these changes translate into changes that they are 
required to address.  In fact, employees will tend to overlook security, if this allows them to 
ease their workload (Albrechtsen, 2007).   
Rasmussen (1997) points to the existence of a natural migration of employees towards a 
boundary of acceptable performance.  A natural human instinct is to find the easiest and 
most convenient way in which to complete work tasks.  In Figure 4, this natural instinct is 
illustrated as a gradient towards the least effort.  This gradient illustrates a natural 
resistance of workloads that are unacceptable, represented as the boundary of 
unacceptable workload.  Pressure from management away from the boundary of economic 
failure, along the gradient of efficiency, provides a natural balance to the gradient of least 
effort.  Acting against each other these gradients move towards a final gradient of functional 
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acceptance.  At the extremes of functional acceptance (along its boundary), efficiency is 
maximised while workload is minimised. 
 
 
This model assists in understanding the role that information security awareness campaigns 
play in organisational security.  If left unabated, either gradient would continue to cross the 
boundary of functional acceptance.  Rasmussen (1997) indicates that at this point errors and 
accidents may occur.  In the context of information security, this might result in a breach of 
the confidentiality, integrity or availability of organisational information security.   
A natural employee focus on moving away from unreasonable workloads exists in each 
organisation.  Employees perceive security measures as adding unnecessary effort to their 
work tasks.  In contrast, management often strive to achieve the highest levels of efficiency.  
In order to achieve the highest levels of efficiency, management will often neglect security 
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Figure 4 - Awareness boundaries (adapted from Rasmussen (1997, p. 189)) 
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measures.  This results from management being primarily interested in resisting the 
boundary of financial failure.   
Neither employees nor management should be able to increase pressure along their 
gradient, without at least some resistance from policy and awareness counter-pressures.  
This awareness might be in the form of policy or controls, but awareness of these policies 
and controls is vital to a counter gradient effort. 
A culture of security awareness will counter the gradients of least effort and efficiency, 
maintaining a balance towards functional acceptance, but not breaching through.  This 
awareness can be achieved through education and awareness programs.  These awareness 
programs are a means of creating the initial awareness, for an information security culture 
defined by policies and controls.   
The use of smartphones as a means of reducing work effort will increase pressure on the 
gradient of least effort.  In contrast, management might introduce smartphones as a means 
to increase productivity.  This will increase pressure along the gradient of efficiency.  
However, both management and employees in their efforts to maximise the pressure on 
these gradients, might neglect smartphone security considerations.   
The quality of the information security management also affects users’ awareness, 
motivation, and behaviour in some way (Albrechtsen, 2007).  Albrechtsen provides a list of 
possible components of an information security awareness program: 
 Information campaigns 
 Education 
 Rewards 
 Technological / Physical measures 
 Legislation 
Kruger and Kearny (2008) add the following items to this list: 
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 Posters 
 Presentations 
 Brochures 
 Intranet resources 
 In-house magazines 
Albrechtsen states that the field of information security has traditionally been directed 
towards technological problems and solutions, and has lacked socio-organisational and 
human aspects.  Al Aboodi (2006) agrees, that in the past security decisions were based 
primarily on technology, and assigned to individuals with technical expertise.  They add that 
because technology itself cannot provide all answers to all problems, managers at the 
highest level have to become more involved in the security strategy and its implementation.  
Creating this top-to-bottom awareness is the first step towards nurturing an organisational 
security culture.   
According to Olzak (2006) the objective of awareness programs is to focus the attention of 
employees on maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information assets.  
Organisational culture as with any culture provides a platform to introduce a set of values, 
principles and expectations for all employees.  It is essential that each employee recognise 
the importance of an organisational culture.  The organisation needs to be centred on 
information security as a key component.  Each employee must be given the opportunity to 
participate in the establishment of these values, principles and expectations.  This will 
increase the likelihood of employees taking ownership of the initiative.  Once employees 
have accepted the need for information security, implementing the support policies is 
greatly simplified. 
  
 
34 
 
2.5 Awareness culture and policy adoption 
Martins and Eloff (2001, p. 1) indicate that, “the way in which people interact with 
information assets and how they behave in the working environment will in time become 
the way in which things are done in an organisation”.  They continue by explaining that the 
way people do things, becomes the organisational culture.  Kruger and Kearny (2008) 
describe security awareness programs as a key defence against security incidents.  They also 
indicate that awareness programs increase awareness of the importance of information 
security.  Kruger and Kearny (2008) identified that awareness programs are normally 
focused on specific areas of concern and that they may include a variety of awareness 
materials such as posters, presentations and brochures.   
Organisational culture provides an effective means of promoting the agenda of information 
security within software consultancies.  Martins and Eloff indicate that organisational 
behaviour has an impact on the security culture within an organisation.  They add that 
organisational behaviour focuses on three different levels, namely the individual, group and 
organisational levels (Martins & Eloff, 2001).  Organisational security policy needs to be 
addressed across each of these levels.  Martins and Eloff (2001) identified key aspects 
addressed across each of these levels.  These aspects are illustrated below in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 - Information security culture model (Martins & Eloff, 2001, p. 5) 
The organisational level introduces all formal policies and procedures.  These are the 
structures for providing the information security culture at a broader level.  Martins and 
Eloff (2001) indicate that without these processes in place, employees might not know how 
to behave or what is expected of them, even though they may be willing to adhere to an 
information security policy.  This implies that the formal policies and procedures actually 
should provide guidance as opposed to restrictions on employees.  Finally, Martins and Eloff 
(2001) add that the responsibility of the organisational level is to provide awareness, 
education and training.  They suggest that organisations benchmark themselves to other 
similar organisations and to international standards such as the ISO27002. 
The group level relies on management and other influential employees to promote 
information security policy.  Furnell and Thomson (2009) state that the culture of an 
organisation is not formed by what management preaches or publishes, but what it accepts 
in practice.  Martins and Eloff (2001) insist that management should provide support and 
guidance in installing an environment of trust between the organisation and its employees.  
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This they suggest is achieved through the implementation of a vision and strategy required 
to protect information assets.   
It is important to recognise that one of the outputs of an awareness culture is productivity 
gains.  A healthy company culture will assist in promoting almost any productivity agenda 
that senior management requires.  This is important when seeking to gain acceptance and 
trust from employees.  A direct result of productivity gains could be an increase in customer 
satisfaction.  Achieving this, while meeting information security obligations would be the 
best possible outcome of the organisation culture programs. 
Trust becomes a very important issue in software consultancies, where often employees 
have elevated access to highly confidential trade information.  Nurturing trust is one of the 
most important elements of information security culture at the group level. 
Martins and Eloff (2001) describe the individual level as governed by the attitude of each 
individual.  The processes and procedures defined at the organisational level, together with 
the guidance of managers and other influential individuals, shape this attitude.  Individuals 
need to be enabled and equipped to form a culture of information security through 
awareness and training. 
2.6 Software consultancies 
This research project focuses on the software consultancy organisation for very specific 
reasons.  Firstly, it is a highly information centred organisation.  Information is a bedrock 
component of this organisation.  Secondly, smartphones provide real benefits to software 
consultancy workers.  Employees of such organisations can use smartphones extensively to 
perform their everyday work tasks.  Finally, information security is more complicated in 
software consultancies, due to this reliance on information and technology, and 
compounded by a highly educated workforce. 
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The definition of a software consultancy varies widely.  For the purposes of this research 
project, a software consultancy is limited to the following definition.  A software 
consultancy is an organisation of people who collectively analyse business information 
requirements and problems to produce an information systems solution to address those 
requirements.  It is important to note from this statement that the input into this 
organisation is information and the output from this organisation is an information 
processing system (or systems).  Thus if we consider the process flow, illustrated in Figure 6 
below, of a software consultancy business unit, we will note that business requirements are 
first translated into data, facts and other forms of information.  Software consultancies 
would then analyse and process these to formulate an information systems solution 
designed to address and solve these requirements.   
At all stages, information is both a key input and output parameter, and a key parameter to 
the success of the business.  Producing the correct solution requires the most accurate and 
comprehensive information inputs.  In software consultancies, it is evident that information 
is a key asset of this organisation.  Dingsøyr (2002) points out that software engineering is a 
knowledge intensive task, frequently changing because of technological and market 
changes. 
 
Figure 6 – Typical software consultancies’ business process flow 
 Software consultancy organisations can be considered great knowledge factories.  
Employees are usually well educated and highly skilled.  Processing the information 
requirements and problems of organisations that contract software consultancies requires a 
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highly skilled workforce.  Often the clients of a software consultancy have complex 
requirements and problems that only specialised information processing can solve.  Simple 
problems could be resolved using traditional ‘off-the-shelf’ software.  This requires highly 
skilled employees. 
One major factor that separates this type of organisation from its competitors is the 
employees that drive it.  People, and the knowledge contained within these people, are the 
tools of the trade in software consultancy organisations.  Hardware and software provide 
little competitive advantage in this industry.  Instead, information and knowledge become 
the key competitive assets of this type of organisation.   
Software consultancies rely on information systems to provide employees with the tools to 
access, store and process the information that they require.  Information workers often 
require information as a tool to perform their work tasks.  Information therefore becomes a 
critical component of their work.  This requires information to be readily available when and 
where information workers require that information.  Smartphones provide an excellent 
medium for accessing, storing and processing information, out of restrictions of time and 
location. 
Storing, retrieving and transporting information assets, introduces various issues that are 
unique to this type of asset.  In order to meet the objectives of this type of organisation, 
employees need to collaborate and share information freely.  Decisions must be able to be 
made quickly.  These decisions require accurate facts and information in order to produce 
the best results.  The employees of software consultancies work collectively in processing 
this information.  At the centre of this industry is a collection of people, who collectively are 
worth far more than the sum of their parts.  This collection of people and the knowledge 
they possess are all part of the modern information workforce. 
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2.7  The information workforce 
People are the ultimate source and destination of the information found within 
organisations.  Information cannot act on itself.  Employees act on information.  Therefore, 
it is important for companies to recognise that the modern workforce is fuelled by 
information.   
The security of information cannot be allowed to hamper the flow of information between 
employees.  Post and Kagan (2007) point out that there must remain a balance between 
protecting information, and enabling authorised access.  They continue to explain that 
tightening security by making systems more inaccessible can hinder employees while 
making them less productive.  Thus striking this balance becomes vital to the success of the 
information security solution. 
Another important factor to consider is that every year more and more millennium 
generation (generation Y) workers enter the workforce.  These workers are comfortable 
using technology to address their information needs.  Mahoney (2009) explains that this 
generation (generation Y), tends to be ambitious and idealistic, embracing new ideas and 
technologies.  She adds that they are confident, flexible and collaborative.  The adoption of 
new technologies is rapidly increasing with the proliferation of workers who view 
technology as a way to make business processes more effective, flexible and mobile, while 
increasing collaboration (Mahoney, 2009).  It is vitally important that organisations factor 
this generation into future information policy considerations.  This generation not only relies 
on information access, they expect it. 
The ease at which modern employees are able to access information serves not only as 
excellent productivity tool, but also as a source of risk.  Restricting access to information 
requires careful consideration.  Employees must understand and accept the policies in place 
to protect organisational information.  This is especially important as without education, 
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users may consider security measures cumbersome and annoying.  Achieving employee 
acceptance greatly reduces resistance to information security provisions. 
2.8   Information security acceptance  
Information security acceptance will be achieved if employees understand the need for 
such.  Hughes and Stanton (2006) explain that companies need to win the hearts and minds 
of their employees before policy will be adopted.  They add that this will require more than 
simply lecturing people.  Users need to completely understand the importance of what is 
being put in place, as well as the reasoning behind it (Hughes & Stanton, 2006).  Furnell and 
Thomson (2009) found that people are often perceived as an obstacle rather than an asset 
to information security efforts. 
Employees will naturally look for the easiest way to perform any task in front of them.  
Unfortunately, the easiest way to perform a task is usually very different to the most 
security conscious approach to performing the same task.  Forcing employees to do a task a 
certain way for the sake of security, is often initially met with resistance.   
Long established organisations, with legacy security policies, also need to accept the 
changing requirements of information security.  Legacy security policies are long-standing, 
and generally accepted, security standards drafted at inception of an organisations’ security 
policy, but not periodically updated.  Existing policies might need to be completely re-
engineered to address ever-changing security requirements.  Long established security 
policies are being rendered inadequate by the changing landscape of information security 
threats.  This has necessitated a response from senior levels of organisation across all 
business components.  
It therefore becomes crucial for employees to both understand, and accept, the reasons for 
doing things in ways that embrace security.  Employees will only accept information security 
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if they are aware of it, and they will only embrace it if it becomes embedded in the culture 
of the organisation (Hughes & Stanton, 2006). 
2.9 Conclusion 
The achievement of information security remains the core underlying focus of this study.  
This chapter provided us with an understanding of the context of information within the 
organisation.  Information plays varying roles across all organisations.  However, its security 
requirements remain the same across all organisations.  The importance of this underlying 
concept remains at the centre of all arguments in this research project.  
Information security is a complex topic to understand due to the natural intangibility of 
information.  This can often be the cause of neglect towards such an important requirement 
of an overall security solution.  It becomes vitally important that companies are able to 
provide comprehensive protection to IT investments, and the information that is 
transported, stored and processed in these systems.  While information security is very 
often only achieved through the security of these IT systems, this is not the only area that 
requires security attention.  As detailed in this chapter, it is important to understand that 
information security requires much more than simply securing the physical IT components.  
People must become a part of this security solution.  Without their involvement, there 
would remain a critical weakness in the information security chain. 
Information security awareness must form part of the organisational culture.  Awareness 
programs and other means need to be applied in order to constantly re-enforce this 
message.  The installation of an information security culture through awareness will 
encourage employees to recognise the true value of information as an asset. 
In this chapter, it was established that information must receive the same level of asset 
classification as physical assets.  Employees should ensure that they demonstrate similar 
levels of caution when dealing with information.  The importance of information security 
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was highlighted in this chapter.  Information security was identified as a means to protect 
information from numerous threats.  These threats were identified as existing both within 
and outside of the organisation.  It was established that information security should not only 
ensure protection of information from intentional threats, but also from unintentional 
threats. 
In order to establish levels of acceptance towards security requirements, this chapter 
introduced the concept of the establishment of a security culture.  This was identified as a 
culture in which security becomes an intrinsic consideration to all decisions. 
This chapter also highlighted the pressure that management and employees put on security 
components as they attempt to maximise efficiency and minimise workload respectively.  
Security was identified as often decreasing efficiency by increasing workload.  Without 
awareness programs to explain the role and importance of security, the findings were that 
employees and managers would tend to place pressure on the boundary of functional 
acceptance.  Beyond this boundary, it was established that undesirable results might occur. 
In section 2.6, the role of information and its security within software consultancies was 
provided.  Information was established as being a provider of business opportunity, but only 
if proper information security is provided.  This chapter also highlighted the defining 
characteristics of the modern information workforce in section 2.7.  As this chapter 
indicated, this is the majority of software consultancy employees.   
The following chapter identifies the smartphone as one of the newest components of risk 
introduced into the IT department’s portfolio.  Smartphones introduce completely new 
threats to organisational information security.  Chapter 3 will consider the risks and threats 
introduced through smartphone devices.  
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3.1 Introduction  
Smartphones have introduced an entirely new dimension of risk to organisational 
information security.  In the past, security only needed to focus on devices that were 
physically tethered to the network of the organisation, or within its physical perimeter. 
Today smartphones introduce the need for wireless security, which according to Stanley 
(2004), are inherently less secure than their wired counterparts are.  It is important to 
understand smartphone risks, and how smartphone security risks, differ from traditional 
security risks.  Hunter (2008) states that, “IT departments already have processes to manage 
desktops and have usually extended these to laptops. Now it is equally vital that PDAs, 
smart phones, and other devices, are managed in the same way”. 
Chapter 2 introduced the concept of information as an asset of the organisation.  
Smartphones, themselves a company asset, are responsible for communicating, storing and 
processing organisational information.  It is important to understand that smartphones are 
not simply physical assets of the organisation, but also repositories of information assets.  
The vulnerability of this information is defined by the vulnerability of smartphone devices. 
In this chapter, smartphone security risks will be assessed in order to establish what risks 
organisations, and more specifically software consultancies, must begin to prepare for.  
Section 3.2 introduces the smartphone device.  This section helps to establish a better 
description of what constitutes as a smartphone in the context of this research project.  In 
section 3.3, the most prevalent or likely risks of smartphone devices are established.  While 
not an exhaustive list, these provide the most likely risks to be encountered by regular 
organisational operation.  Section 3.4 then places these risks into the context of a software 
consultancy organisation.   
Before the risks associated with smartphones can be understood, it is important to provide 
an acceptable definition of a smartphone for the purposes of this research project. Once a 
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definition has been provided, the unique security challenges of the smartphone can be 
analysed within the context of the provided definition.  
3.2 Introducing the smartphone 
Gartner (2009) research group define the smartphone as a “large-screen, voice-centric 
handheld device designed to offer complete phone functions while simultaneously 
functioning as a personal digital assistant (PDA)”.  Palm provides the following definition, “a 
portable device that combines a wireless phone, e-mail and Internet access and an organiser 
into a single, integrated piece of hardware” (Elgan, 2007).  These definitions provide a 
reasonable description of the operational facilities provided by these devices.    
                         
Figure 7 - The HTC HD2, Blackberry Storm and Nokia E72 
The HTC HD2, Blackberry Storm and Nokia E72, pictured above, are examples of smartphone 
devices available from standard cellular retail stores.  These devices all contain a large 
screen and keyboard for data input, display and processing.  All of these devices are 
equipped with multiple wireless communication technologies. 
Defining a device as a smartphone or regular mobile phone is often difficult.  This research 
project does not wish to provide a definitive definition for what exactly constitutes as a 
smartphone.  Any device displaying all of the characteristics identified in Table 2 below can 
be considered to be within the scope of the definition of a smartphone device for this study. 
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Table 2 - Smartphone characteristics (adapted from Gartner and Palm) 
Characteristic Considered a smartphone if... 
Size 
The device is compact; battery operated, easily transported and can be 
operated by hand (finger) or stylus. 
Operating System 
The device runs on an operating system that allows external (3rd party) 
applications to be installed and run on the device. 
Connectivity 
The device provides multiple methods (wired and wireless) of 
connecting to both the internet and other devices and networks. 
Input 
The device contains either a hardware or software based ‘QWERTY’ 
style keyboard, designed for extended data input. 
Storage capacity The device has a large and expandable storage facility. 
Office functionality 
The device provides the ability to perform basic office tasks such as 
email, take notes and word processing. 
Calendar The device includes a digital organiser and calendar. 
Synchronisation 
The device supports synchronisation of information with fixed desktop 
or laptop devices, or online web services. 
Regular Phone Features The device performs voice, text and multimedia message functions. 
Some standard mobile phones provide one or more of the characteristics above, but only 
smartphones are capable of all.  Therefore, any device that satisfies all of the criteria of each 
characteristic in Table 2 above can be considered a smartphone under this definition. 
Devices that display these characteristics are likely to be used by information workers, to 
store, transport and process information.  A device centred on other characteristics such as 
multimedia or photography is less likely to be used as business tools in organisations.  
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Regular mobile phones are not capable of storing and processing the same volumes of 
organisational information, thus rendering them as a lower risk to the organisation. 
As devices become easier to operate, their uptake and acceptance will increase rapidly.  
Some estimates have predicted a 30% year-on-year growth in the sale of smartphones 
between 2007 and 2012 (Reardon, 2007).  This, coupled with rapidly decreasing unit prices, 
has placed smartphones within reach of all employees. 
3.3 Smartphone information security weaknesses 
With ample storage capacity built into smartphone devices, and massive expansion 
capabilities available, employees are able to store large quantities of corporate information 
on these devices.  This information forms part of the collective of information assets 
belonging to the organisation.  While stored on smartphone devices, the information is 
often worth more than the unit cost of the smartphone itself.  Therefore, the security of this 
information can be determined by assessing the risks of the smartphone device.  Botha, 
Furnell and Clarke (2009) provide a list of smartphone security risk categories.  These are 
discussed in this section.  
3.3.1 Expandable storage 
Botha, Furnell and Clarke (2009) point out that early generations of cell phones and PDA’s 
had relatively little storage capability.  Johnson (2009) indicates that today’s generation of 
devices can be quickly and easily upgraded by adding additional storage cards. 
 
Figure 8 - Storage expansion cards (Johnson, 2009) 
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However, very often these cards are not encrypted, and do not require separate 
authentication in order to access the information that they contain.  This introduces an 
element of risk, should the device, stick or card fall into the wrong hands.  Botha, Furnell 
and Clarke (2009) state that a malicious user would be able to insert unencrypted expansion 
media from a one device into another device in order to easily access that information. 
3.3.2 Physical threats 
Because of their mobile characteristics, smartphone devices are also more likely to be 
exposed to destructive elements such as sand, water or fire than fixed machines.  Botha, 
Furnell and Clarke (2009)  found that smartphones are more vulnerable to physical threats 
such as theft and accidental loss, than larger systems in fixed locations.  Unfortunately, for 
organisations this has resulted in new components to their information security risk 
portfolio.  
3.3.3 Configuration and users 
One of the key challenges of smartphone security is that these devices can perform both 
personal and work related tasks.  Quite often, the device belongs to the employee 
personally.  Even where the device is company issued, employees will tend to personalise 
their device to their preferences.  According to Botha, Furnell and Clarke (2009), this is has 
become a significant point of neglect by organisations, who have failed to acknowledge that 
users are often responsible for configuration of their smartphones, while administrators 
secure their desktops.  They point out that end users may not possess the technical 
expertise to ensure that their devices be configured securely.  Furnell, Josoh and Katsabas 
(2006) point out, that although some users will actively seek to overcome secure 
configurations, the most likely scenario is that security configurations will be unused or 
configured incorrectly. 
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3.3.4 Authentication 
Botha, Furnell and Clarke (2009) also found that smartphone users are of the opinion that 
periodic re-authentication is intolerable on smartphone devices, but widely accepted on 
desktop machines.  This they concluded was due to the way that smartphones are used 
versus desktop machines.  Jürjens, Schrek and Bartmann (2008) explain that users tend to 
have a short and nomadic usage pattern with smartphones, leading to reduced acceptance 
of full-blown security checks for relatively low and spontaneous uses.  Clark and Furnell 
(2007) add that existing PIN-based techniques are under-utilised, and provide an inadequte 
level of protection when compared to the sensitivity of data and services accessible through 
the devices. 
Smartphone devices are usually used to perform a limited set of tasks in an equally limited 
period.  In contrast, major undertakings are performed on the desktop machine over 
extended periods.  Therefore, users would tend to configure their smartphone device to 
deliberately avoid periodic re-authentication for the sake of convenience. 
3.3.5 Communication 
Another unique challenge introduced with the smartphone, is that these devices are no 
longer limited to communicating over only the public cellular network.  As previously 
pointed out, smartphones possess a number of available connectivity methods.  Jürjens, 
Schrek and Bartmann (2008) explain that the difference in thoughput, latency, cost and 
availability justify having these alternatives.  However, as Botha, Furnell and Clarke (2009) 
point out, smartphone users are required to configure network connection security settings 
for each network that they connect to.   
The majority of users do not know appropriate security settings, and will connect to the 
least secure network, that requires minimal configuration.  Jürjens, Schrek and Bartmann 
(2008) reiterate this by stating that this (multitude of device configurations) leads to various 
combinations depending on the set of requirements essential for the given usage scenario. 
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3.3.6 Applications 
Mobile applications are rapidly becoming available for smartphone devices.  These 
applications are targeted at providing access to the same information that users access on 
their desktop machines.  While the level of sensitivity of the data remains the same, the 
security level of smartphone applications is usually much lower than the desktop version of 
the same application.  Botha, Furnell and Clarke (2009) point out that the smartphone 
version of internet explorer, IE Mobile, has only three security options, compared to 45 on 
the desktop version.  They also found, that the mobile version of Microsoft Word does not 
support some of the key security components of the desktop version.  Jürjens, Schrek and 
Bartmann (2008) point out that the provision of patches, updates (such as virus signatures), 
is difficult on mobile platforms such as smartphones. 
 
Figure 9 - Smartphone information security risks summary (Botha, Furnell, & Clarke, 2009) 
Illustrated above are the key risk areas identified by Botha, Furnell, and Clarke.  These risks 
need to be targeted in order to increase the security level of the information stored, 
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processed and transferred by these devices.  Furnell (2005) states that antivirus protection 
is likely to become as important on mobile devices as it has become on desktop systems. 
3.4 Smartphone risks in a software consultancy environment 
Software consultancy organisations are perfectly positioned to take advantage of the 
benefits introduced by smartphone devices.  They operate by identifying and implementing 
software based solutions, to business problems and requirements.  As discussed in Chapter 
2, software consultancies employ large numbers of information workers.  The smartphone 
provides the perfect solution for management, and communication, of the information that 
drives these individuals.   
There are numerous business cases for the smartphone device.  A study conducted in 2005 
by Cellcom found revenue generation of around $28 billion annually, as a result of the 
ability to receive data from anywhere with mobile broadband services (Pahl, 2009).  
However, as noted by Doherty & Fulford (2006) the risks to information on mobile 
computing platforms, such as smartphones, is exacerbated as staff are away from the 
normal in-house controls and monitoring regimes. 
3.4.1 Smartphone information responsibilities in software consultancies 
Software consultancy employees of all levels deal with vast amounts of information on a 
daily basis.  This information is usually part of a collective effort towards achieving a work 
task.  The work tasks processed by software consultancy organisations produce information 
deliverables.  The information deliverables usually feed into other work tasks, effectively 
creating a chain of information flowing from customer requirements through to solutions 
development.  Information becomes both an input and output of each process in this type 
of organisation. 
Smartphones are capable of driving the flow of information between work tasks.  Certain 
work processes might benefit from smartphone information communication and processing.  
With instant access from any location, these devices are capable of eradicating certain work 
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tasks completely, by routing information more responsively.  Of course, with this comes an 
increase in the vulnerability of information. 
Compromise to any of the three pillars of information security, (confidentiality, integrity or 
availability) would result in delays and threats to the entire process.  At the same time, 
minimising the time it takes to make decisions based on information is key to optimising this 
process chain.  Figure 10 below, displays the typical flow of information deliverables 
between work tasks.  Conventional product driven manufacturing processes are often 
limited by physical constraints.  In software consultancies, information is only limited by 
ability of the consultants to identify, store and communicate it.   
 
Figure 10 - Software consultancy process flow 
Optimising the flow of information is achievable using many different techniques and 
technologies.  One of which is the smartphone.  Senior management should see it in their 
best interest, to ensure that the storage and transmission of information is as rapid and 
efficient as possible.  Smartphone implementation can satisfy management’s requirements, 
of an efficient medium of information storage and transmission, but only if done so in a 
secure manner. 
Due to the nature of business in software consultancies, the information that is processed is 
highly confidential.  This results from the business and trade secrets that are identified for 
inclusion in the information systems, and information deliverables, that are the outputs 
from software consultancies.   
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3.4.2 The perception created by smartphone security 
Considering Rasmussen’s (1997) model in Figure 4, smartphone implementation into 
software consultancy organisations, can be considered a movement away from the 
boundary of economic failure.  This is due to increases in efficiency, which results in 
reducing operating costs, and increasing profit.  As established in this model, employees will 
tend to migrate away from the boundary of unacceptable workload (Rasmussen, 1997).  
This means that employees will gradually reject components of smartphone devices, or their 
implementation, which can be perceived as adding unnecessary workload to their work 
tasks.  This is often the perception created by smartphone security requirements. 
As indicated previously, smartphone security is tolerated less than desktop security.  This 
increases pressure on the gradient towards least effort, as employees attempt to reduce 
effort by neglecting security requirements.  With both strong pressure from management 
towards increasing efficiency, and from employees towards least effort, pressure on the 
boundary of functional acceptance becomes intensified.  Rasmussen (1997) indicates that if 
this pressure is allowed to breach through the boundary of functional acceptance, 
undesirable results may occur.  Without security awareness to ensure that smartphone 
security risks are mitigated, software consultancy organisations would experience increased 
risk to their information assets. 
Employees with technical expertise are capable of configuring devices to minimise the 
interruption of security components.  Management similarly drive employees to ensure that 
they are as efficient as possible.  This increases pressure towards the boundary of functional 
acceptance.  Awareness programs, policies and other mitigating mechanisms would ensure 
that there is a balance maintained between each of the three boundaries.   
3.5 Smartphone risk management and mitigation contrasts 
Some of the key differences between smartphone security and security of other devices 
were outlined earlier in this chapter.  These are summarised in Table 3.    
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Table 3 - Smartphone versus traditional security risks 
Risk area Traditional risk Smartphone risk 
Users Users are more aware of security 
requirements of desktop and laptop 
devices. 
Users do not understand 
security requirements of these 
devices.  Users are less tolerant 
of security  
Authentication Authentication performed by a 
centralised network, configured and 
controlled, by the organisation.  
Authentication is usually performed 
once at the beginning of the working 
session. 
Authentication must be 
performed by the device even 
when disconnected from the 
network. Authentication 
requested multiple times during 
the course of the working day.   
Configuration Typical security configuration is 
performed by network 
administrators.  Machines are 
restricted by network security 
policies. 
Devices are configured by 
employees according to 
personal preference.  Far less 
security configuration options 
are available on mobile 
operating systems. 
Communication Traditional communications are 
performed across trusted wired or 
wireless networks. These networks 
are configured by internal system 
administrators. 
Smartphone devices must be 
able to communicate regardless 
of position. This requires them 
to communicate through 
untrustworthy third party 
networks. 
Physical Threat Traditional computer equipment is 
less vulnerable to physical threats as 
it is secured by the perimeter 
defences of the organisation. Access 
controls can be easily installed to 
reduce the physical threat to 
equipment. 
Smartphone devices are far 
more vulnerable to physical 
threats. Due to their mobility 
requirements and smaller 
physical form, these devices are 
much more difficult to protect 
from these threats. Devices are 
also much easier to misplace. 
Application Security Traditional applications execute on 
mature operating systems with more 
established security components. 
Applications are patched more 
frequently. Desktop machines are 
commonly equipped with anti-virus 
software and client firewalls. 
Mobile applications are 
developed for operating 
systems that contain a subset of 
security components found in 
desktop operating systems. 
Most smartphone users neglect 
to install smartphone anti-virus 
software. 
Removable media Desktop machines are less likely to 
contain removable media.  This 
reduces the chance of information 
being removed from the machine.  
Network administrators are easily 
able to restrict removable media 
from being connected to desktop 
and laptop devices if required. 
It is highly likely to find 
removable media attached to 
these devices. This removable 
media usually does not share 
similar security restrictions with 
the device itself. Media can 
often be removed and accessed 
from other devices. 
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Managing organisational smartphones becomes complicated, as personal devices make 
their way into the corporate environment.  In addition, smartphone devices found in 
companies might be from multiple different hardware manufacturers, with various 
operating systems and models. 
As soon as smartphone devices become a security risk, management will take steps to 
restrict their usage.  This would result in a loss of the advantages possible through proper 
smartphone integration.  Khokhar (2006) and Davis (2006) point out increased productivity, 
greater job satisfaction and increased flexibility as a result of mobile usage.  This is especially 
relevant to information industries such as software consultancies.  Employees can increase 
productivity, by using smartphone devices to accelerate the capture and transmission of 
information.  To avoid restrictions, proper procedure and control must be implemented.  
Smartphone users must be aware of these procedures and controls.   
Management must obtain the support of smartphone users, as they are ultimately 
responsible for the proper configuration of their personal devices.  Employees should be 
made aware of their security requirements and policy expectations.  This will not only 
ensure better security of their devices and personal information, but that of the 
organisations information.   
Where companies issue devices, employees must be understand the security capabilities 
and requirements of these devices.  Employees must understand the risks to both the 
device and its information.  Once employees are better equipped to manage their own 
device security, management will be able to manage the security of the information without 
restricting, or banning, smartphone usage. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In Chapter 3, the smartphone was comprehensively addressed.  The security and risk 
profiles of smartphone devices were examined.  Smartphones were also identified as a 
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means of providing a strategic enabling function to the flow of information within software 
consultancy organisations. 
Section 3.2 provided the definition of a smartphone device for the purposes of this research 
project.  This included a description of the characteristics typically found in smartphone 
devices.  In the section 3.3, the security weaknesses inherit to smartphone devices were 
listed.  This provides an answer to the first sub-question of this research project. 
Section 3.4 placed these risks into the context of the software consultancy organisations, 
highlighting the concerns, which might be faced through the proliferation of smartphone 
devices into these organisations.  Finally, some of the key differences between smartphone 
risks and traditional desktop risks were pointed out in section 3.5. 
A set of controls needs to be established and installed, in order to mitigate against the risks 
introduced with smartphone implementation.  Developing a basis from which these policies 
and controls can be composed, would prove overwhelming for an individual organisation.  
Software consultancy organisations should instead consider existing security frameworks, as 
a basis from which they can establish a smartphone security solution.  Two such 
frameworks, discussed in the following chapter, are the COBIT 4.1 framework and the 
ISO27002.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Karyda, Kiountouzis, and Kokolakis (2005)  state that the implementation of an IS security 
policy should be translated into guidelines, procedures and to-do lists that must be put into 
practice by information system users.  The content of these policies according to them is 
dependent on the context of the organisation.  Karyda, Kiountouzis, and Kokolakis (2005) 
reason that there is no single security solution or policy that can fit all organisations.  This is 
in line with the interpretive paradigm used within this research project. 
As highlighted in previous chapters, user adoption of policy is paramount in ensuring that it 
is successful.  Organisations attempting to implement an authoritarian approach to security, 
risk losing support from end users.  Karyda, Kiountouzis, and Kokolakis point out, that this 
might result in users circumventing security measures, in order to perform as efficiently as 
possible.   
Considering Rasmussen’s model from Figure 4, security policies supported by awareness 
programs will resist employee circumvention.  For employees, the functional acceptance 
boundary does not include distracting security requirements.  This is because security 
requirements are perceived by employees, to add additional steps to work tasks.  It 
becomes important that user circumvention of these security requirements be avoided, 
through proper security awareness.   
Accordingly, management should ensure that they do not simply seek the most efficient 
definition of working requirements.  This would include the least amount of security 
possible, in order to maximise efficiency.  Both employees and managers should subscribe 
to a common set of security requirements and policies.  These policies are required in order 
to maintain a balance between employee, management and security requirements.  This 
balance requires security experimentation to discover an optimum level of security and 
efficiency.  This should be achievable through proper adaption of existing best practice 
approaches, to the context of smartphone security in software consultancy organisations. 
 
59 
 
In order to achieve this, best practice approaches must be indentified from existing security 
frameworks.  Two such frameworks are the COBIT 4.1 framework and ISO27002.  These 
security frameworks are both widely accepted and utilised in the information technology 
industry.  Independent global groups manage them both, through continuous revision.  They 
are also independent of organisational and industry constraints.  Both were developed with 
best business practices at their core and by experts within the field of information security. 
4.2 The COBIT 4.1 Framework 
The most recent version of the COBIT 4.1 framework at the date this research project was 
compiled was version 4.1.  All references to COBIT 4.1 in this research project refer to 
version 4.1 of that framework. 
4.2.1 COBIT 4.1 Introduction 
The COBIT 4.1 framework provides good practices across a domain, and process framework, 
and presents activities in a manageable and logical structure (IT Governance Institute, 
2007a, p. 4).  COBIT 4.1 is a representation, of the consensus of experts, in the domain of 
information governance (IT Governance Institute, 2007a).   
This places the COBIT 4.1 framework in an excellent position to provide expert governance 
advice, for controlled implementation of new technologies such as smartphones.  
Implementing or preparing for any new technology introduces various unpredictable risks.  
It is impossible to predict all the risks that a new technology will introduce.  Management 
must ensure that sufficient controls are in place to mitigate against as many risk possibilities 
as possible.   
COBIT 4.1 provides a link between business requirements and information technology 
requirements, defining management control objectives to be considered.  Employees need 
to be made aware of the possible areas of risk. 
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4.2.2 Content analysis 
The COBIT 4.1 framework is illustrated by a process model that subdivides IT into 4 domains 
and 34 processes (IT Governance Institute, 2007a).  Figure 11 below outlines the key 
principles of the COBIT 4.1 framework.   
Managing IT investments through adequate process, delivers the enterprise information, 
which satisfies business requirements.  COBIT 4.1 provides recommended control 
objectives, to assist in choreographing this effort.  COBIT 4.1 also ensures that all 
stakeholder responsibilities are clear and adequate measurement devices available.  
Ongoing measurement is a key part of monitoring the control objectives. 
 
Figure 11- Basic principles of COBIT 4.1  (IT Governance Institute, 2007a) 
From this cycle, the importance of these 34 processes in delivering enterprise information 
from IT resources is illustrated.  These processes are organised into four separate domains.  
The four interrelated IT domains are illustrated in Figure 12.   
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Figure 12 - The four interrelated domains of COBIT 4.1 (IT Governance Institute, 2007a) 
The Plan and organise domain covers the strategic and tactical concerns, including the way 
in which IT can best contribute to the achievement of the business objectives (IT 
Governance Institute, 2007a).  This domain addresses the strategic advantages of 
infrastructure investments.  This domain further ensures optimum use of resources, and 
awareness of organisational IT objectives.  Awareness covers the understanding and 
management of risks.  Finally, this domain ensures that the quality of the IT systems, are 
appropriate for business needs. 
The second domain, acquire and implement, addresses the solutions that need to be 
identified, developed or acquired, as well as implemented into the business process.  Other 
items covered by this domain include changes to existing systems, new projects, new 
implementations and business continuity. 
The deliver and support domain focuses on the actual delivery of required services.  This 
includes the delivery, management of security and continuity, service support for users and 
management of data and operational facilities.  For this domain, other items covered 
include, cost optimisation, service delivery, productivity and safety, and adequate 
information security (confidentiality, integrity and availability). 
The final domain, monitor and evaluate, introduces the need for IT processes to be regularly 
assessed over time for their quality and compliance with control requirements.  This domain 
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is concerned with issues such as performance management, monitoring and regulatory 
compliance.  The task of this domain is to identify problems early, and ensure adequate 
information security.  These domains work together to ensure that adequate controls are 
present across the entire organisation.   
The COBIT 4.1 framework provides a complete set of high-level requirements to be 
considered by management, for effective control of each IT process (IT Governance 
Institute, 2007a).  Due to the sheer number of different types of smartphones, operating 
systems and potential uses, management would not be able to provide a specific set of 
instructions.  Instead, management must ensure that an adequate set of high-level controls 
are provided, in such a way that they generically cover as many possible security 
requirements as possible.  Using the COBIT 4.1 framework, management can identify these 
high-level controls, and adapt the policies, procedures and practices mapped out in the 
framework, to the requirements of smartphone security.  Finally, this can be adapted to the 
specific requirements found within software consultancy organisations. 
The COBIT 4.1 framework introduces a measurement-driven approach in order to ensure 
that management can actively respond to process performance.  The introduction of any 
new technology will need to be subjected to performance analysis, in order to ensure that 
there is a positive return on that investment.  Maturity models of the COBIT 4.1 framework 
can assist in measuring the gap between where the organisation is, and where it needs to 
go. 
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The COBIT 4.1 framework covers five specific IT governance areas: 
 
Figure 13 - IT Governance focus areas (IT Governance Institute, 2007a) 
Of these five areas, this research project will only focus on COBIT 4.1 domain processes of 
which the area of “risk management” is the primary focus.  This ensures that the solution 
focuses on providing a model that satisfies solely the requirements of measuring 
smartphone security readiness.  Risk management is the most relevant governance area in 
relation to information security management.  Risk management seeks to embed the 
responsibilities of security into the organisation.  This is aligned to the main goal of this 
research project; measuring smartphone security risks.   
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The following table lists the COBIT 4.1 processes that target risk management: 
Table 4 - Risk management focused COBIT 4.1 process items 
COBIT 4.1 Process Code Process description 
PO4 Define the IT Processes, Organisation and Relationships 
PO6 Communicate Management Aims and Direction 
PO9 Assess and Manage IT Risks 
DS2 Manage Third-party Services 
DS4 Ensure Continuous Service 
DS5 Ensure Systems Security 
DS11 Manage Data 
DS12 Manage the Physical Environment 
ME2 Monitor and Evaluate Internal Control 
ME3 Ensure Compliance With External Requirements 
ME4 Provide IT Governance 
The process items included in the table above provide strategies for the management of 
risk.  These risk management controls will form a core part of a smartphone security 
readiness model.  Three of the four domains are represented (plan and organise, deliver and 
support and monitor and evaluate), as these three each contain processes that target risk 
management as a primary objective.  The acquire and implement domain does not have any 
processes which target risk management as a primary objective. 
4.2.3 Risk management processes 
The previous section outlined the 11 processes identified from the COBIT 4.1 framework, of 
which risk management is a primary objective.  Further analysis of these processes, will 
assist in identifying how these are applicable to a possible smartphone security readiness 
model.  From these processes, questions will be compiled, as part of the research 
instrument of this research project. 
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The COBIT 4.1 cube (Figure 14), summarises the organisation components addressed by 
each the COBIT 4.1 processes, and illustrates their relationship to each other.  The cube 
presents three separate related, but disparate, organisational constructs.   
The three faces are listed below: 
 Business Requirements (which drive investments in...) 
 IT Resources (that are used by...)  
 IT Processes (delivering information responding to the business requirements) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 - The COBIT 4.1 cube (IT Governance Institute, 2007b) 
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On the front face of the cube, the IT processes are illustrated as belonging to a particular 
domain, and containing various activities.  These processes are applied across the IT 
resources displayed on the face to the right hand side of the cube.   
The IT resources provided by COBIT 4.1 are listed below: 
 Applications 
 Information 
 Infrastructure 
 People 
Each of the processes provided to govern these resources, seeks to fulfil at least one of the 
business requirements.  The business requirements are listed on the upper face at the top 
of the cube.  The COBIT 4.1 framework identifies the primary business requirement satisfied 
by each process along with the key resources involved.   
Using this, smartphone security risks can be placed into respective resource categories.  
Figure 15 categorises each of the smartphone security risks identified in Chapter 3.  Each of 
these risks are then categorised under one primary resource area. 
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Figure 15 - Resource risk categories 
The risk of mobile application security is categorised under the resource category of 
applications.  Mobile application security was noted in Chapter 3 as being substandard, 
especially when compared with more mature desktop-based software.  Within the resource 
category of information; authentication and the risk of removable media have been 
identified.  The risk of authentication identified, is that information could be accessible by 
persons who are not or should not be allowed to access it.   
Removable media in itself (its physical form) is a component of the infrastructure resource.  
However, the risk identified here relates to the information contained within the removable 
media.  Removable media is therefore categorised under the category of information.  The 
physical risk aspect of removable media is covered under the broader risk of physical 
threats.   
The category of infrastructure includes configuration risk, communication risk and that of 
physical threats.  Secure configuration of devices, requires security right through from the 
infrastructure level.  Hardware and software configuration requires security management, 
and the support of existing infrastructure security measures.  Communication between 
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device and organisational networks might not always be across trusted communication 
channels.  It is important that the boundary infrastructure between these communications 
channels is secure.   
Physical threats to smartphone devices are higher due to their small size and mobility 
characteristics.  It might prove difficult to provide a level of infrastructure security on a 
device as small and as mobile as a smartphone.  However, organisational infrastructure 
security should extend to secure smartphone devices, even when they are outside of 
organisational perimeter security controls. Finally, smartphone users appear under the 
people category. 
Each smartphone risk is now associated as a risk belonging to a primary organisational 
resource.  This will assist in mapping the relevant COBIT 4.1 process against each 
smartphone risk.  Table 5 below lists the smartphone risk areas with their corresponding 
resource category, as defined in the COBIT 4.1 framework.  These are mapped to the COBIT 
4.1 process items, which target risk management as a primary concern as listed in  
Table 4. 
Table 5 - COBIT 4.1 smartphone risk process matrix (IT Governance Institute, 2007b) 
Risk Area Resource 
category 
COBIT 4.1 Process 
PO4 PO6 PO9 DS2 DS4 DS5 DS11 DS12 ME2 ME3 ME4 
Application security Applications   X X X X   X X X 
Authentication Information  X X X X X X  X X X 
Removable media Information  X X X X X X  X X X 
Configuration Infrastructure   X X X X  X X X X 
Communication Infrastructure   X X X X  X X X X 
Physical threat Infrastructure   X X X X  X X X X 
Users People X X X X X X   X X X 
Table 5 above, provides specific control objective mappings, for each of the identified 
smartphone risk areas from Figure 9.  By combining the COBIT 4.1 process items and 
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resource categories, to each of these risk areas, appropriate risk mitigation controls can be 
identified and implemented.  These can then be applied to each of the risk areas. 
For each of the identified processes, COBIT 4.1 provides a list of implementation activities.  
These activities provide a list of actions to be implemented by various authority positions 
within the organisation.  These activities are utilised in the empirical portion of this research 
project. 
Goals and metrics are provided for each of the process items.  These provide a mechanism 
for measuring whether the IT expectations from business are being met by IT.  They indicate 
what process goals and metrics each process must deliver, so that it can support the 
objectives of IT.  Finally, they indicate what must happen inside a process, in order to 
achieve the required performance, and how it can be measured (IT Governance Institute, 
2007b). 
4.2.4 COBIT 4.1 Conclusion 
The strength of the COBIT 4.1 framework centres on the high-level strategic approach to risk 
management defined in the framework.  It becomes easier to identify the core 
requirements for risk management of a new technology, when the COBIT 4.1 framework is 
adapted to the specific requirements of that technology.  Using the COBIT 4.1 framework in 
conjunction with a supporting standard, such as the ISO27002, the high-level policy control 
objectives can be applied to best business practices. 
4.3 The ISO27002 code of practice 
The ISO27002 began as a code of practice for information security.  The department of trade 
and industry in the United Kingdom developed it, first published in the early nineties.  In 
1995, it was re-published by the British Standards Institute (BSI) as the BS7799-1  (ISO 17799 
News, 2006).  In 1999, it underwent a major revision to significantly strengthen the 
standard.  The standard set was fast-tracked through ISO within that year, and become 
known as the ISO 17799.  Finally, in 2005, the standard was again republished as the 
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ISO27002 (ISO 17799 News, 2006).  The reference version for this research project is the 
Standards South African version, which is identical in content to the original version. 
4.3.1 ISO27002 Introduction 
The purpose of the ISO27002 standard is to establish guidelines and general principles for 
initiating, implementing, maintaining and improving information security management in an 
organisation (Standards South Africa, 2005).  The guide provides guidance on the commonly 
accepted goals of information security.  The control objectives outlined in the ISO27002 
document seek to address the requirements identified in a risk assessment (Standards 
South Africa, 2005). 
This document is also fully compatible with the control clauses contained within the COBIT 
4.1 framework.  Together they provide a formidable and complimentary approach to risk 
management. 
4.3.2 Content analysis 
The ISO27002 standard consists of 11 security clauses, which collectively contain 39 main 
security categories (IT Governance institute, 2006) . 
The IT Governance institute provides a mapping document, which maps the components of 
the COBIT 4.1 framework, to that of the ISO27002 framework.  Using this document, the 
components of the COBIT 4.1 framework selected as targeting risk management from 
Table 4, can be mapped to the objectives of the ISO27002 standard.  
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Figure 16 - ISO27002 (IsecT Ltd., 2008)  
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Table 6, provides a list of the COBIT 4.1 framework processes, which target risk 
management, along with a list of ISO27002 objectives that map to these.  The first column 
displays each of the COBIT 4.1 processes that target risk management as a primary 
objective.  The right hand column lists each of the ISO27002 objectives that map to that 
process, according to the mapping document.  
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Table 6 – ISO27002 to COBIT 4.1 mapping items adapted from (IT Governance institute, 2006) 
COBIT 4.1 
Process Code 
ISO27002 objectives mapped to COBIT 4.1 Process 
PO4 6.1, 6.2, 7.1, 8.1, 9.1, 10.1, 10.6, 15.1 and 15.2 
PO6 5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 7.1, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 9.1, 9.2, 10.7, 10.8, 10.9, 11.1, 11.3, 11.7, 
12.3, 13.2, 15.1 and 15.2 
PO9 5.1, 13.1 and 14.1 
DS2 6.2, 8.1, 10.2, 10.8, 12.4, 12.5 and 15.1 
DS4 6.1, 10.5 and 14.1 
DS5 5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 9.1, 9.2, 10.1, 10.4, 10.6, 10.7, 10.8, 10.9, 10.10, 
11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, 11.7, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.6, 13.1, 13.2, 
15.1, 15.2 and 15.3 
DS11 9.2, 10.5, 10.7, 10.8, 12.4 and 15.1 
DS12 6.2, 9.1 and 9.2 
ME2 5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 10.2, 10.10, 15.2 and 15.3 
ME3 6.1, 15.1 and 15.2 
ME4 5.1, 6.1 and 10.10 
These objectives must be satisfied, in order to satisfy the requirements of each of the COBIT 
4.1 processes that primarily target risk management.  This is based on the relationships 
defined by the mapping document.  The following sections cover each of these objectives, 
and identify any relationships to smartphone security. 
Objective 5.1) Information security policy 
In section 2.5 of this research project, the need for the acceptance of security policy by 
employees is highlighted.  The ISO27002 highlights this by indicating the importance of 
establishing a clear policy direction in line with business objectives, and the demonstration 
of support for this policy.  In order to achieve adequate information security when 
implementing and using smartphone devices, a clear policy must be available.  A 
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commitment to this policy is required, and regular policy maintenance must take place.  
Information security policy applies across each of the smartphone security risk areas 
identified in section 3.3. 
Objective 6.1) Internal organisation 
The ISO27002 indicates that an internal security framework group must be established to 
act within the organisation towards the establishment and implementation of security 
controls.  Some of the roles identified for this framework include the management of 
security policy, assignment of security roles, co-ordination and review of security across the 
organisation.  Internal organisation, as with security policy, applies through all the security 
risk areas of smartphones. 
Objective 6.2) External Parties 
Smartphone communication often occurs over third party networks.  The ISO27002 
highlights the importance of ensuring that all external party interaction with organisational 
information is both controlled and secured.  Security policies must exist that protect the 
information sent, processed and stored by external networks and parties. 
Objective 7.1) Responsibility for Assets 
The ISO27002 indicates that appropriate protection of organisational assets must be 
achieved.  This will assist in protecting the information stored on these devices.  The 
ISO27002 points out the importance of keeping a register of all assets, such as smartphone 
devices that are issued to employees.  Chapter two highlighted the importance of the 
information asset of smartphone devices, this needs to include the actual device itself.  The 
protection of the device and its information must remain the responsibility of the employee 
who is in charge of that device.  Extra care must be taken to include any removable media 
that the device includes. 
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Objective 8.1) Prior to Employment 
Through this section, the ISO27002 stresses the importance of establishing that all potential 
employees, contractors and third parties are aware of security requirements prior to their 
employment.  Future employees must be made aware of the sensitivity of organisational 
information that they will be working with. 
Objective 8.2) During Employment 
Section 8.2 ensures that during the course of employment, employees, contractors and 
third party users are aware of information security threats and concerns.  During 
employment, employees must be made aware of their responsibilities and liabilities, and 
adequate levels of awareness, education and training in security should be provided.  
Finally, a formal disciplinary process for handling security breaches should be established. 
Objective 8.3) Termination or change of employment 
In section 8.3, the responsibility of ensuring that an employee’s, contractor’s or third party 
user’s exit from the organisation is managed is highlighted.  The removal of all equipment 
and access rights is vital to a successful and secure exit. 
Objective 9.1) Secure Areas 
The objective of section 9.1 is to prevent unauthorised physical access, damage, and 
interference to the organisation premises and information.  Due to the mobility 
requirements of smartphone devices, section 9.1 is not targeted towards equipment that is 
intended to be operated outside of secure areas.  However, smartphone devices must still 
be stored in secure areas, especially when travelling. 
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Objective 9.2) Equipment Security 
Preventing loss, damage, theft or compromise of assets and interruption to the 
organisation’s activities.  This section highlights the importance of protecting equipment 
from physical and environmental threats.  Section 9.2 states that protection of equipment 
reduces the risk of unauthorised access to information.  Smartphone users must ensure that 
adequate security is applied to protect the device from unauthorised access.  This section 
provides controls that are able to enforce measures that increase equipment security. 
Objective 10.1) Operational procedures and responsibilities 
Ensuring the correct and secure operation of information processing facilities is the 
objective of section 10.1.  Through this section, segregation of duties is recommended to 
ensure that the risk of negligent or deliberate system misuse is mitigated.  Smartphones 
might form part of an information processing facility.  In such cases, controls must be 
applied to ensure that smartphones become a secure component of such facilities. 
Objective 10.2) Third party service delivery management 
In order to implement and maintain the appropriate level of information security and 
service delivery, section 10.2 indicates that third party service agreements should be 
implemented.  Organisational checks must exist to ensure that the services delivered meet 
all requirements agreed with the third party.  Smartphone usage usually includes 
communication over third party networks and software.  It is important that controls are in 
place to ensure the security of these third party agreements and service contracts where 
they involve organisational information. 
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Objective 10.3) System planning and acceptance 
This section states that provision must be made to minimise the risk of system failures.  The 
ISO27002 standard states that advance planning and preparation are required to ensure the 
availability of adequate capacity and resources to deliver the required system performance. 
Objective 10.4) Protection against malicious and mobile code 
The integrity of software and information is ensured in section 10.4.  Precautions are 
provided to ensure prevent and detect the introduction of malicious code, and unauthorised 
mobile code. 
Objective 10.6) Network security management 
Section 10.6 focuses on ensuring the protection of information in networks, and the 
protection of the supporting infrastructure.  As established in earlier chapters, smartphones 
often communicate information over public or third party networks.  Section 10.6 provides 
controls to reduce the risk of information security breaches when using these networks. 
Objective 10.7) Media Handling 
One of the risk factors associated with smartphone devices included removable media.  
Section 10.6 provides that media must be controlled and physically protected.  This includes 
all other types of media. 
Objective 10.8) Exchange of Information 
One of the advantages of smartphones identified in a previous chapter is the relative ease in 
which information can be achieved using these devices.  Section 10.8 establishes that 
security must be maintained when exchanging information both within and outside of the 
organisation.  Formal exchange policies should be established and carried out in line with 
exchange agreements and legislative requirements. 
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Objective 10.9) Electronic commerce services 
Smartphone devices are perfectly positioned to make use of electronic services.  Section 
10.9 ensures that implications associated with using electronic commerce services, including 
on-line transactions, and the requirements for controls are considered.  This section targets 
both the integrity, and availability components of the information security triad first 
introduced in Chapter 2. 
Objective 10.10) Monitoring 
As with internal access to information systems, access from external devices such as 
smartphones must be monitored.  All legislative requirements applicable to monitoring and 
logging activities must be applied to smartphone usage, as with desktop devices.  
Monitoring provides the ability to check the effectiveness of controls adopted to verify 
conformity to and access policy model. 
Objective 11.1) Business requirements for access control 
Section 11.1 is responsible for providing the controls to restrict access to information.  The 
ISO27002 standard states that access to information, information processing facilities, and 
business processes should be controlled based on business and security requirements. 
Objective 11.2) User access management 
Formal procedures are highlighted in section 11.2 which specify that access rights to 
information systems and services must be controlled.  These procedures must cover all 
stages in the life cycle of user access, from the initial registration of new users to the final 
de-registration of users who no longer require access to information systems and services. 
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Objective 11.3) User responsibilities 
In order to prevent unauthorised user access and compromise or theft of information and 
information processing facilities, section 11.3 stipulates that user cooperation is essential.  
Users are required to take ownership of the security requirements of smartphone usage.  
Access codes must remain strictly confidential. 
Objective 11.4) Network access control 
Network access controls prevent unauthorised access to networked services.  This covers 
both internal and external networked services.  This section adds that user access should 
not compromise the security of the network. 
Objective 11.5) Operating system access control 
Operating systems, including those on smartphone devices must prevent unauthorised 
access.  Security facilities should be configured to restrict access by unauthorised users to 
operating systems. 
Objective 11.6) Application and information access control 
Section 11.6 indicates the need to prevent unauthorised access to information held in 
application systems.  It is important that logical access to application software and 
information should be restricted to authorised users. 
Objective 11.7) Mobile computing and teleworking 
This section is focused on mobile devices of which smartphones are included.  Specific 
controls targeted at protecting the information security of these devices are covered by 
section 11.7.  
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The ISO27002 (2005) specification states that mobile computing policy should include the 
requirements for physical protection, access controls, cryptographic techniques, back-ups, 
and virus protection. 
Objective 12.2) Correct processing in applications 
The objective of section 12.2 is to prevent errors, loss, unauthorised modification or misuse 
of information in applications.  This section continues by adding that appropriate controls 
should be designed into applications, including user-developed applications to ensure 
correct processing.  These controls should include the validation of input data, internal 
processing and output data. 
Objective 12.3) Cryptographic controls 
Cryptographic controls protect the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of information 
by cryptographic means.  Policy is required to ensure that adequate cryptographic controls 
are utilised in smartphone security where feasible. 
Objective 12.4) Security of system files 
As established in earlier chapters, smartphones are capable of storing very large quantities 
of system files.  Section 12.4 is responsible for providing controls to protect these files and 
those files that are accessible to smartphone users on system file serves. 
Objective 12.5) Security in development and support processes 
Project and support environments should be strictly controlled.  This ensures that 
management are responsible for the security of the project or support environment.  All 
proposed system changes need to be checked for security risks. 
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Objective 12.6) Technical Vulnerability Management 
The importance of reducing risks from the exploitation of published technical vulnerabilities 
is covered in section 12.6.  Considerations should be extended to included operating 
systems, and any other applications in use. 
Objective 13.1) Reporting information security events and weaknesses 
Section 13.1 ensures that information security events and weaknesses with information 
systems are communicated in a manner allowing timely corrective action to be taken.  It is 
important that employees, contractors and third party users are aware of the procedure to 
follow when reporting any security events or weaknesses.  Formal event reporting and 
escalation procedures should be established and put in place.  Feedback forms a very 
important part of a successful security strategy. 
Objective 13.2) Management of information security incidents and improvements 
In earlier chapters, the importance of employees understanding their security 
responsibilities and procedures was introduced.  A consistent and effective approach must 
be applied to the management of information security incidents.   
Objective 14.1) Information security aspects of business continuity management 
To counteract interruptions to business activities and to protect critical business processes 
from the effects of major failures of information systems or disasters and to ensure their 
timely resumption (Standards South Africa, 2005).  Smartphones are usually support devices 
as opposed to critical infrastructure, however, they must form part of continuity and 
contingency considerations. 
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Objective 15.1) Compliance with legal requirements 
All company activities and equipment must be fully compliant with legislative requirements. 
This includes mobile devices and smartphones, which may contain or process confidential 
personal information.  Section 15.1 highlights the importance of ensuring all statutory and 
legislative requirements are considered when designing and implementing a smartphone 
security solution. 
Objective 15.2) Compliance with security policies and standards, and technical compliance 
Once security policies and standards are established, it is important that employees comply 
with these.  The importance of information systems should be regularly reviewed.  Section 
15.2 indicates that such reviews should be performed against the appropriate security 
policies and the technical platforms and information systems should be audited for 
compliance with the applicable security implementation standards and documented 
security controls. 
Objective 15.3) Information systems audit considerations 
Information systems must be audited regularly and the protection of the operational 
systems and audit tools is paramount in ensuring the integrity, and prevention of the misuse 
of audit tools. 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
The COBIT 4.1 framework was selected, as it is an industry accepted and respected 
guideline, in implementing IT governance measures.  It was found to consist of 34 processes.  
In this chapter, 11 processes of the COBIT 4.1 framework of which risk management was a 
primary objective, were identified.  Risk management was selected due to its focus on the 
management of risks associated with information technology governance.    
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The smartphone security weaknesses identified in section 3.3 could now be categorised into 
a IT resource category, and ultimately will become part of the final research model.  This 
ensures that the security weaknesses are adequately addressed by the final research model.  
Furthermore, the information category provides assurance that the information security 
requirements identified in Chapter 2 will also be addressed. 
This chapter also introduced the ISO27002 standards set.  The standard was found to 
contain over 39 security categories.  Using the COBIT 4.1 to ISO27002 mapping document, 
28 of the 39 security categories were found to map to the 11 COBIT 4.1 processes identified.   
 
Figure 17 - Empirical framework composition 
 
This process has streamlined both the components of the COBIT 4.1 framework and the 
ISO27002 standard to a reduced set of requirements from which a smartphone security 
model can be compiled.  These processes will be included in the empirical framework in 
order to provide an answer to the second sub-question.  When applied to the particular 
risks identified for smartphone devices, the requirements of the empirical framework can be 
compiled to include each of the required controls and processes. 
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The following chapter introduces the methodology, empirical framework and case study.  By 
defining the specific components from each of the COBIT 4.1 framework and the ISO27002 
standards set, a targeted subset of controls and processes have been indentified from which 
this methodology, empirical framework and case study will be developed. 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will introduce the methodology, empirical framework and case study.  The 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies are contrasted, in order to establish which 
would be better suited to the requirements of this research project.  Similarly, the research 
assumptions are contrasted, in order to determine the most suitable.  The remainder of the 
chapter will focus on the method used to perform the empirical portion of the research 
project. 
In the final sections of this chapter, the data collection method and research instrument is 
discussed.  The chapter will conclude by indicating the results from the pilot study tests, of 
the case study data collection instrument.  The changes due to recommendations from pilot 
study participants are highlighted before a brief section that introduces secondary data 
sources is provided. 
5.2 Research methodology 
Myers (1997) indicates that while research methods can be classified in various ways, one of 
the most common distinctions made is between qualitative and quantitative research 
methods.  Myers (1997) adds that quantitative research methods were originally developed 
in the natural sciences to study natural phenomena.  By contrast, qualitative research 
methods were developed in the social sciences to enable researchers to study both social 
and cultural phenomena. 
Chapter three found, that the smartphone platform is not yet at the technical security 
maturity of desktop based systems.  Chapter two of this research project pointed out that, 
people and organisational culture form a large part in establishing a successful smartphone 
security implementation.  Myers (1997) states that the motivation for doing qualitative 
research comes from the observation that humans possess the ability to communicate.  
Myers indicates that humans have the ability to form both social and cultural constructs 
based on their interactions with each other.  Morgan and Smirchich (1980, p. 498) add that 
 
87 
 
“once one relaxes the ontological assumption that the world is a concrete structure, and 
admits that human beings, far from merely responding to the social world, may actively 
contribute to its creation, the dominant methods [quantitative] become increasingly 
unsatisfactory, and indeed, inappropriate”. 
Qualitative research provides the facility for understanding the social components required, 
in developing information awareness in employees.  Awareness programmes depend on 
successful communication in establishing or re-enforcing their messages.  Qualitative 
research can assist in understanding how successful communication can lead to successful 
awareness programs.  This helps mitigate the risks exposed by any immature levels of 
existing smartphone security.  
Myers (1997) adds that researchers often combine both quantitative and qualitative 
methods in one research project.  A method referred to as triangulation.  
5.2.1 Philosophical assumption 
Myers (1997) indicates that three distinct philosophical assumptions exist, into which all 
research projects can be classified.  These are positivist, interpretive and critical.  Myers 
cautions that the distinctions between these assumptions are often not always so clear-cut.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 - Characterising the subjective-objective debate (adapted from Morgan and Smircich 1980 - Table 1) 
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The social influence in the problem statement for this research project, positions 
the philosophical assumption of reality, for this research project, as leaning towards 
the subjective  (interpretive) approach. 
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Morgan and Smircich (1980) portray reality as a continuum between the extremes of 
objective and subjective assumptions (See Figure 18).  This best illustrates the difficulty in 
cutting a clear distinction between the assumptions.  Table 7 below, highlights the 
differences between three philosophical assumptions.   
Table 7 - Philosophical assumptions (Myers, 1997) 
Philosophical 
assumption 
Description 
Positivist  Assumes that reality is objectively given and can be described by 
measureable properties, independent of the observer and his or 
her instruments. 
 Test theory, in an attempt to increase the predictive 
understanding of phenomena. 
 Evidence of formal propositions, quantifiable measures of 
variables, hypothesis testing, and the drawing of inferences 
about a phenomenon from the sample to a stated population. 
Interpretive  Reality is only through social construct such as language, 
consciousness and shared meaning. 
 Attempts to understand phenomena through meanings that 
people assign to them. 
 Aimed at providing an understanding of the context of the 
information system. 
 Influenced by the context. 
 Does not predefine dependant and independent variables, but 
focuses on the full complexity of human sense making the 
situation emerges. 
Critical  Assume that reality is historically constituted, produced, and 
reproduced by people. 
 The ability to consciously act to change social and economic 
circumstances is constrained by various forms of social, cultural 
and political domination. 
 Socially critical, restrictive and alienating conflicts and 
This research project 
leans towards the 
interpretive approach 
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contradictions of the status quo are brought to light. 
 Focuses on the oppositions, conflicts and contradictions in 
contemporary society. 
 Seeks to eliminate the causes of alienation and domination. 
 
This research project leans towards the interpretive approach.  The questioning of personal 
subjective opinion within the context of the problem area will be used to formulate a model 
solution.  Morgan and Smircich (1980, p. 498) point out that, “if one recognises that the 
social world constitutes some form of open-ended process, any method that closes the 
subject of study within the confines of a laboratory, or merely contents itself with the 
production of narrow empirical snapshots of isolated phenomena at fixed points in time, 
does not do complete justice to the nature of the subject.” 
5.2.2 Method of study 
The method of study, according to Myers (1997), provides a strategy of inquiry that moves 
from the underlying philosophical assumptions to research design and data.  Each method 
changes the manner in which the researcher harvests the data required for the research 
project.  Myers (1997) adds that each method relies on different skills, assumptions and 
research practices.  He lists the following qualitative research methods: 
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Figure 19 - Qualitative research methods (Myers, 1997) 
The case study method is the most commonly used of the four qualitative methods above, 
however ethnographic and grounded theory methods are becoming more common (Myers, 
1997).  Based on the above definitions, the case study addresses the requirements of this 
research project.  Myers (1997) states that, “case studies investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.  Morgan and Smircich (1980, p. 498) note 
that researchers can no longer remain “external observers”, but must move to investigate 
from within the subject of study and employ research techniques appropriate for such a 
task.  Case studies can provide such a technique. 
Using a case study, this research project addresses the context of existing security, by 
identifying the boundary between this context and the phenomenon introduced through 
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smartphone security risk.  Due to the immaturity of smartphone security, these boundaries 
may not always be as evident as with other technologies. 
5.3 Empirical framework 
The empirical framework outlines the process by which the experimental or observable 
portion of the research method is to be completed.  The empirical framework is tightly 
coupled to the underpinning research theories and paradigm.  The researcher has selected 
multiple case studies utilising a questionnaire, to serve as the research instrument for 
primary data collection.  In order to satisfy the requirements of a case study, a lengthy 
questionnaire will be utilised to in order to conduct an in depth study.  The following section 
introduces the case studies, followed by the primary data collection process. 
5.4 Case study 
In order to gain insight into the security risks of smartphone devices, this study is performed 
as multiple case studies.  Tellis (1997, p. 1) points out that, “multiple cases strengthen the 
results by replicating the pattern-matching, thus increasing confidence in the robustness of 
the theory”.  The case studies centre on a convenient multiple software consultancy 
organisations, randomly selected.  The questionnaire is instructed to be answered within 
the context of the organisation at which the respondent is employed.  Each software 
consultancy selected, displayed the following key characteristics: 
1) Information services are the primary services offered by the organisation. 
2) The organisation employs information workers to render these services. 
These characteristics bring together key elements that must be consulted when identifying 
smartphone security requirements.  These elements are the information and people of the 
organisation.  Together, information and people form part of the bedrock of smartphone 
security requirements.  It is important to point out that smartphone proliferation, of any 
percentage, or nominal value is not a pre-requisite for that organisation to participate. 
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Each case study is interpretive in its approach and seeks to identify the perceived 
smartphone security requirements of that organisation, even if they do not currently exist.  
This is achieved by asking each respondent what is important to their organisational 
context.  As opposed to asking what is currently in use. 
By requesting that respondents provide an interpretive opinion that is not influenced by any 
existing security measures, or lack thereof, the results from each case study provide a 
perceived set of best smartphone security requirements.  This provides  the specific 
requirements important to each respondent.  The converse is that all items perceived to be 
of lower importance are also identified.  Collectively, the case studies provide a set of 
comparative responses in which trends are identified.  This provides the details for a model 
that is based on a collectively quantified best security approach across multiple 
organisational contexts.   
5.4.1 Primary data collection 
The primary data for this research project is the results returned by each of the 
questionnaires.  Respondents were urged to provide their subjective opinion to all questions 
that they encountered on the questionnaire.  In providing subjective opinions to the 
questions, the qualitative component of the research methodology is satisfied.  Once the 
primary data collection was completed, analysis took place to reveal any trends and 
patterns that existed.  This process introduces the quantitative component, together with 
the qualitative results.  The triangulation of both research methodologies assists in 
establishing a sufficient quantity of qualitative results. 
These results were used to identify the components required to design the assessment 
model output of this research project.  Questionnaires were presented in the form of 
separate case studies.  Each questionnaire sought to identify the perceived requirements of 
a respondent for their organisation.  This allowed the respondents to provide their own 
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subjective perceptions of smartphone security requirements, within their organisations 
security requirements context. 
The structure of the questionnaire is based on a Likert Scale question format.  Each of the 
questions are phrased as a security requirement.  This requirement effectively becomes a 
question statement.  The statements are adapted from the activities recommended by each 
of the COBIT 4.1 processes identified in Chapter 4.  67 Question statements are included in 
the questionnaire.  These activities are listed by each of the COBIT 4.1 processes that target 
risk management as a primary objective. 
The question statements are a verbatim copy of the recommended COBIT 4.1 process 
activities, with the object or subject of that sentence re-phrased to represent either 
smartphones, or the role of smartphones.  These altered statements will be scrutinised by 
pilot study participants, to ensure that the meaning or intention of those statements is not 
lost, by altering the statement.  Appendix A provides a list of the original statements along 
with the altered statement.  Two statements were omitted from the questionnaire as they 
targeted a specific security component, other than the smartphone.  
The following table lists the COBIT 4.1 processes and their respective number of activities. 
Table 8 - COBIT 4.1 Process activities 
Processes that target risk 
management as a primary 
objective 
Number of activities identified for the 
Questionnaire 
 
PO4 5  
PO6 3  
PO9 10  
DS2 6  
DS4 11  
DS5 7  
DS11 5  
DS12 5  
ME2 7  
ME3 5  
ME4 5  
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The Likert Scale selected was the level of importance that respondents felt statement to 
have, within the context of their organisation.  An example of a question statement, and its 
Likert Scale, is provided below in Table 9.  Respondents were asked to read each statement 
as part of the question, “how important is it to [their company] that ...”, followed by each 
statement.  This made it easier, and clearer, for the respondent to understand what each 
statement was asking.  It also reduced the amount of reading that needed to be done by the 
respondent.  Reading the same opening question for each statement question might also 
fatigue the respondent.  In addition, it provided a greater context for the statement. 
Table 9 - Question example 
A smartphone process framework has been developed. 
 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Low Importance Moderately 
Important 
Very Important 
When read with the previously provided prefix, the statement reads as follows: how 
important is it to [your company] that a smartphone process framework has been 
developed.  The Linkert Scale requires respondents to provide an opinion as the answer.  
The provided answer is therefore the subjective opinion of the respondent, based on 
security requirements within the context of that organisation. 
In addition to the statements, the following administrative, ethical and statistical questions 
were provided at the start of the questionnaire. 
1) Would you prefer your company to be listed as an anonymous participant? 
2) Are you directly responsible for the definition, implementation OR maintenance of 
the security requirements of your organisation? 
3) Approximately how many workers are accountable to the information security 
requirements of your organisation? 
4) Does your organisation’s security policy specifically address any risks of smartphone 
computing? 
 
95 
 
5) Are smartphones generally considered as a strategic enabling technology within your 
organisation? 
6) Are smartphones generally viewed as a risk to the information within your 
organisation? 
These questions assist in providing an idea of the size, and basic smartphone security 
maturity at that organisation, separate to the perceived importance of the security 
statements that follow.  The provided an additional context and dimension to the primary 
data that was collected.  This additional context enhanced the trend analysis component of 
the data analysis further. 
Finally, it is important to mention that all respondents that indicated that they wished for 
their organisation to remain anonymous had any identifiable information removed from the 
results.  No personal information is required in the analysis of the data.  Organisational 
security requirements are more important to this research project, than the identity of the 
organisation.   
Fifty-eight (58) responses were received from the case study requests.  These responses 
represent a convenient sample from an unknown population.  The responses were imported 
into a database for safekeeping, and in order to provide an easy method of performing 
queries to the data.  The data was imported directly from the online questionnaire service 
into the database; no modifications were made to the raw response data.  
There were a small number of incomplete questionnaire responses, which were discarded 
as spoilt.  These results were not included in any of the response data statistics.  Responses 
from respondents, who indicated that they had misunderstood the requirements during the 
pilot study, were also removed from the final results.  This ensured that the results reflected 
a universal understanding of the questionnaire requirements. The following section 
introduces the pilot study conducted prior to the primary data collection. 
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5.4.1.1 Pilot study 
In order to ensure that the questionnaire provided the highest quality responses, a select 
number of respondents conducted a pilot study.  The pilot study took place two weeks 
before the questionnaire was scheduled to be released.  Pilot study participants were 
randomly selected.  Pilot study participants were asked to complete the questionnaire, 
however they were given the following additional instructions: 
1) Indicate approximately how long it takes you to complete the questionnaire? 
2) Please mark any questions that you feel are unclear, ambiguous, and irrelevant or 
duplicate the recommendation of another question (also indicate whether you 
would recommend they be removed or modified)? 
3) The flow of the questions (is the order logical, or would you have preferred a 
different or random ordering)? 
4) Are the instructions clear? 
5) Any additional comments or recommendations would be appreciated. 
Initial responses from the pilot study revealed that respondents found some 
misinterpretations between the questionnaire instructions, and the requirements of the 
questionnaire.  Based on these results, the instructions were updated, until respondents 
agreed that the instructions accurately explained the intentions of the researcher.   
There was no negative feedback regarding the length or content of the questionnaire.  The 
ethical, administrative and statistical questions were understood, and accepted, by all pilot 
study participants.  As mentioned previously, pilot study results were discarded for all 
respondents that indicated that they had misinterpreted the initial instructions. 
5.4.2 Secondary data 
Secondary data will be comprised of information collected from various sources.  Sources 
include the following: 
 The COBIT Framework version 4.1 
 The ISO27002 code of practice 
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 Articles from various academic journals 
 Books 
 Conference proceedings 
Only the most recent data available was included.  All secondary data is referenced, to 
ensure that the original author is accredited.  All references are listed in full at the end of 
this research project. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the research methodology for this research project was established as a 
triangulated combination of both the qualitative and quantitative methods.  The qualitative 
approach was expected to take a larger role, due to the social and cultural influences 
around smartphone security requirements. 
The philosophical assumption to this research project was established to be that of an 
interpretive approach.  From this approach, the reality of the study would be based on 
social constructs.  This enables respondents, through their subjective opinions, to interpret 
the security requirements of smartphone devices.  This ties into the qualitative method 
through the Likert Scale questions utilised in the questionnaires of each case study.  
Collectively a quantitative analysis of these results would reveal trends in the opinions of 
respondents. 
A questionnaire was developed as the research instrument for this research project.  A pilot 
study was conducted, to ensure that the questions and instructions provided by the 
questionnaire resulted in accurate responses.  Once the recommendations of pilot study 
participants were implemented, the questionnaire was circulated.  The following chapter 
presents the results of the questionnaire, and introduces the resulting model.  
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will introduce both the model and findings of this research project.  Section 6.2 
will provide a statistical analysis of the quantitative results of the case study responses.  Any 
trends identified will be listed, and compared to the literature.  Section 6.3 will thereafter 
propose the recommendations. 
In order to enhance the comparative component of the analysis, the results will first be 
considered for all respondents; and then separately based on the respondents’ response to 
the following question: “Are you directly responsible for the definition, implementation OR 
maintenance of the security requirements of your organisation?”.  This criterion was best 
suited to divide all respondents into one of the two gradients detailed by the awareness 
boundary model (detailed in Chapter 2) which is illustrated below.  Nineteen (or 33%) of the 
58 responses were from respondents that indicated that they were responsible for security 
policies at their organisation. 
 
Boundary of 
functional 
acceptance 
Boundary of 
Unacceptable 
workload 
Boundary of Economic 
failure 
Experiments to 
improve 
performance 
Respondents who indicated that 
they were responsible for 
security requirements 
Respondents who indicated 
that they were NOT responsible 
for security requirements 
 
Counter gradient from 
awareness campaigns 
Controls such as the 
COBIT 4.1 framework 
Figure 20 - Awareness boundaries (adapted from Rasmussen (1997, p. 189)) - Case study overlay 
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In Figure 20 above, the separate case study populations are transposed onto the awareness 
boundary model.  Here it becomes easier to identify that respondents, who are not 
responsible for security requirements, are inclined to be moving away from the boundary of 
unacceptable workload.  This is because these respondents would consider security 
requirements to be unnecessary extra workload (extra workload pushes them towards the 
boundary of unacceptable workload).  This is confirmed in Chapter 2 by Ruighaver, 
Maynard, and Chang (2007).  They found that there is no evidence that employees are 
intrinsically motivated to adopt secure practices.   
Respondents responsible for implementing security requirements must do so in order to 
protect the organisation from anything that might result in economic failure.  Therefore, 
those respondents who indicated that they were responsible for implementing security 
requirements move in the gradient away from the boundary of economic failure. 
The question statements used in the case study questionnaire simulate a counter gradient 
provided by the recommendations of the COBIT 4.1 framework.  By determining the 
optimum requirements of both gradients away from economic failure and unacceptable 
workload, each of these gradients can focus on pushing towards the boundary of functional 
acceptance.  Any significant disparity between the gradients does not translate into an 
effort towards functional acceptance, but rather against each other. 
6.2 Findings 
In order to quantify the Likert Scale responses, each of the responses was allocated a score.  
The score allocated to the individual responses is detailed in the following table.  
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Table 10 - Likert scoring allocation 
Likert scale answer Scoring 
Very Unimportant -2 
Unimportant -1 
Neutral 0 
Low Importance 1 
Moderately Important 2 
Very Important 3 
Scoring each of the response answers, allows an average score to be determined for each of 
the statements.  The scores can be added together for each question, and averages can be 
easily calculated.  The following ruler illustrates the scale used to illustrate answers: 
 
 
 
The scale represents a range beginning at -2 (Very Unimportant) and ending at 3 (Very 
Important).  This allows us to approximately position items at their actual position between 
the scale steps.  Answers might lie at any position on the line. 
The findings reveal a number of interesting results when the entire population is examined.  
The overall average importance for respondents across all questions was below 1 (between 
neutral and low importance) at 0.80 points.  This supports the argument that employees do 
not perceive smartphone security to be of moderate or high importance to their 
organisation.  The results indicated similar levels of perceived importance of smartphone 
security, regardless of whether or not respondents indicated that they were responsible for 
the security policies at their organisation. 
 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral 
Low 
Importance 
Moderately 
Important 
Very Important 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Figure 21- Answer scale ruler 
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Figure 22 - Overall average selection, by responsibility of respondent 
The results were analysed along the following criteria: 
 Determination of the question statements that received the highest score ratings. 
o Overall 
o By respondents who were responsible for security policies. 
o By respondents who were not responsible for security policies at their 
organisation. 
 Determination of the question statements that received the lowest score ratings. 
o Overall 
o By respondents who were responsible for security policies. 
o By respondents who were not responsible for security policies at their 
organisation. 
 Determination of the question statements that yielded the greatest discrepancies 
between the respondents responsible for security policy, and those not responsible. 
o Above standard deviation. 
o Below standard deviation. 
 Determination of the level of importance across each of the represented domains 
from the COBIT 4.1 framework. 
By categorising and analysing the information according to these criteria, the trends were 
much easier to identify.  The following graph (Figure 23) presents the overall average result 
across each question.  The numbers along the vertical Y-axis directly correlate to the scale 
steps on the answer scale ruler.  Interesting to note is how the average score for the first 18 
questions is 1.08, which is higher than the overall average (0.80) for the entire answer set.   
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral 
Low 
Importance 
Moderately 
Important 
Very Important 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Average response for respondents responsible for 
security requirements at their organisation 
 
Average response for respondents NOT responsible 
for security requirements at their organisation 
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These question statements are from the Planning and Organising domain of the COBIT 4.1 
framework.  This is discussed in detail later in the chapter.  In Chapter 4, three of the four 
domains from the COBIT 4.1 framework were identified which target risk management as a 
primary objective.  
 
Figure 23 - All questions: average result, all respondents 
The graph in Figure 23 highlights the distribution of importance levels across each of the 67 
questions given to respondents.  As discussed above, a breakdown of each of the 
components of the questions is provided in the following sections. 
6.2.1 Highest scoring question statements  
The following five question statements received the highest scores overall between all 
respondents: 
Table 11 - Top five question statements, overall scores 
Question Question statement Score 
4 (PO4) Smartphone users are aware of who owns the data processed and stored on 
their device. 
1.31 
3 (PO4) Smartphone system owners have been identified. 1.24 
6 (PO6) A smartphone control environment and framework has been established, and 
is being maintained. 
1.14 
14 (PO9) Smartphone risks associated with events have been assessed. 1.14 
0
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All questions : average result, all respondents
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34 (DS4) Smartphone information backup storage and protection has been planned for 
and implemented. 
1.14 
Four of the top five question statements selected by all respondents come from the 
Planning and Organising domain.  The statement that received the highest overall level of 
importance was question statement four.  Overall, respondents found that user awareness 
of the data stored and processed on smartphone devices to be of high importance.  Olzak 
(2006) highlighted the importance of employee awareness in an effective information 
security solution. 
Question 3 received the second highest rating of importance at 1.24.  Respondents found 
that it is very important that smartphone system owners be identified.  According to the IT 
Governance Institute (2007b), owners are responsible for classifying information and 
systems, and protecting them in line with this classification. 
Three question statements received equal importance of 1.14.  Question statement six, 
received a relatively high rating of importance.  This question statement highlights the 
importance of implementation and maintenance, of a smartphone control framework.  One 
aligned with the organisations’ management philosophy and operating style. 
The second question statement that received an importance level of 1.14 was question 
statement 14.  This question statement highlights the importance of identifying possible 
risks to smartphone security. 
Question statement 34 was the only question statement that was not from the Planning and 
Organising domain.  It too received an importance level of 1.14.  This question statement 
highlights the importance respondents placed on backup and security of the information on 
smartphone devices. 
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Table 12 - Top five question statements, respondents responsible for security requirements 
Question Question statement Score 
10 (PO9) The relative strategic business objectives of smartphones are understood. 2.11 
14 (PO9) Smartphone risks associated with events have been assessed. 1.78 
3 (PO4) Smartphone system owners have been identified. 1.67 
11 (PO9) Relevant smartphone business process objectives are understood. 1.67 
46 (DS11) Smartphone data is backed up according to scheme. 1.67 
When considered as a separate population, respondents that indicated they were 
responsible for security at their organisations selected a different top five.  Only one item is 
from the Deliver and Support domain, the rest are from the Planning and Organising 
domain. 
The most important question statement for this group is question statement 10.  Question 
statement 10 received an importance of 2.11.  This was the highest recorded for a single 
question statement across all respondents and population splits.  This question statement 
involves understanding the relative strategic objectives of smartphones.  In Chapter 2, 
Martins and Eloff (2001) indicated that without processes, employees might not know how 
to behave, or what is expected of them.  A strategy must be defined, and then understood 
by all employees. 
Question 14 was the second highest rating at 1.78.  This question statement, along with 
question statement three, also appeared in the overall top five.  Question three received 
and importance level of 1.67, along with two other question statements, 11 and 46.  
Question statement 11 is very similar to question statement 10.  Both deal with strategic 
objectives.  Question 11 differs in its focus on process level requirements as opposed to 
business level requirements.  This does reinforce the importance of strategic objectives in 
smartphone security considerations. 
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Finally, question statement 46 echoes the sentiments of question statement 34.  Both 
highlight the importance of ensuring that a backup policy exists.  Question statement 46 
adds the importance of defining a specific backup scheme to smartphone security 
requirements. 
Table 13 - Top seven question statements, respondents not responsible for security requirements 
Question Question statement Score 
4 (PO4) Smartphone users are aware of who owns the data processed and stored on 
their device. 
1.30 
6 (PO6) A smartphone control environment and framework has been established, and 
is being maintained. 
1.10 
3 (PO4) Smartphone system owners have been identified. 1.05 
25 (DS4) An IT continuity framework has been developed, and this framework includes 
smartphones. 
1.05 
8 (PO6) Smartphone control  frameworks, objectives and direction have been 
communicated to smartphone users. 
1.00 
13 (PO9) Events associated with smartphone objectives have been identified. 1.00 
34 (DS4) Smartphone information backup storage and protection has been planned for 
and implemented. 
1.00 
39 (DS5) Smartphone user access rights and privileges are periodically reviewed and 
validated. 
1.00 
Finally, Table 13 lists the responses that received the highest importance level, from 
respondents who indicated that they were not responsible for security requirements.  This 
table contains the top seven responses.  This is due to four statements sharing the fourth 
highest level of importance.  Three items were from the Deliver and Support domain, the 
other four are all from the Planning and Organising domain. 
Question statement four received the highest level of importance (1.30) for this population, 
similar to its position in the overall population.  Question statement six received the second 
highest level of importance (1.10).  This question also appears in the overall top five.  
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Following this, question statement three received an importance rating of 1.05, and is the 
only one to appear on all three lists. 
Question statement 25 also received a rating of 1.05.  This question statement is centred on 
the importance of developing an IT continuity framework, which includes smartphone 
devices. The next question statement, eight, is the first of four question statements to 
receive an importance rating of 1.00, by respondents who indicated that they were not 
responsible for security requirements.  In question statement eight, respondents found that 
it is important for smartphone control frameworks, objectives and directions to be 
communicated to smartphone users. 
Also receiving an importance rating of 1.00, question statement 13 highlighted the 
importance of identifying the events associated with smartphone objectives.  Question 
statement 34, which appeared in the previous top five, also received an importance rating 
of 1.00 for this population group.  Finally, question statement 39 was the final statement to 
receive an importance rating of 1.00.  This question statement provides the importance of 
periodically reviewing and validating user access rights and privileges.  
6.2.2 Comparison between population groups 
Two distinct population groups were identified earlier in this chapter.  These groups were 
then identified to align with one of the two gradients of the awareness boundary model.  
Figure 24 below provides a graph of the difference between the importance rating of 
respondents responsible for security requirements and those not responsible, for each 
question statement. 
The difference between each question answered by both population groups falls within a 
standard level of deviation.  From this graph, it is easier to identify those questions that fall 
outside of the standard deviation.  These items present the most disparities between the 
two population groups.  Establishing which items present the greatest disparities, assists in 
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identifying the factors that cause the gradients (population groups) to act against each 
other. 
The standard deviation for the difference between each of the population groups is 
0.35598.  This creates an upper level of 0.61 and a lower boundary of -0.10.  Any differential 
between each of the population groups that falls outside of this boundary will be considered 
a significant disparity.  Figure 24, illustrates the standard deviation upper and lower 
boundaries, from which each of the items outside of these boundaries is revealed.   
 
Figure 24 - Standard deviation between the two population groups 
The following table lists the questions that display differences, which fall outside the 
standard level of deviation: 
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Table 14 - Question statements outside of the standard deviation level 
Scope Question Statement 
Above the standard level of deviation 3, 10, 11, 14, 29, 43, 46, 47, 50, 57 
Below the standard level of deviation 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 33, 39, 44, 55, 67 
An even split is observed between those above and those below standard deviation.  
Twenty-one (21) question statements in total fall outside of the standard deviation level.  
This is just short of one in every three questions.  Items above the standard deviation level 
are of greater importance to respondents responsible for security at their organisation.  
Items below this level are more important to respondents who are not responsible for 
security at their organisations. 
6.2.2.1 Top five items above standard deviation 
These items find particular support amongst respondents who indicated that they were 
responsible for security requirements at their organisations. 
Question statement ten recorded the highest deviation between the groups.  Strategic 
objectives for smartphones are found to be important to respondents who are responsible 
for security requirements, with an importance level of 2.11.  This is not the case for 
respondents who are not responsible for security requirements.  This population only 
recorded an importance level of 0.60. 
Question statement fourteen displays the second highest level of deviation above standard.  
This indicates the importance of establishing the smartphone risks associated with events, if 
far greater to respondents responsible for security requirements. Question statement 46 
follows in third position.  The importance of establishing a set backup scheme displayed 
much greater significance to respondents responsible for security requirements.   
Finally, question statements 11 and 47 provide the fourth and fifth highest level of deviation 
above the stand level.  Respondents responsible for security place greater emphasis on the 
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relevance of business process objectives and data restoration procedures, than respondents 
who were not responsible. 
6.2.2.2 Top five items below standard deviation 
These items find particular support amongst respondents who indicated that they were not 
responsible for security requirements at their organisations. 
Question statement 20 exhibited the greatest level of deviation below the standard level of 
deviation.  Respondents not responsible for security requirements allocated this statement 
an importance of 0.75, versus 0.33 allocated by those respondents not responsible for 
security requirements. This question statement rates the importance of defining and 
documenting the supplier management processes. 
Question statement 67, which deals with the IT governance report, receives much higher 
support from respondents not responsible for security than those who are responsible.  This 
statement displays the second highest level of deviation below the standard level.  The third 
highest level of deviation below the standard is question statement 39.  This statement 
highlights smartphone user access rights and privileges. 
Finally, question statements 24 and 23 respectively scored the fourth and fifth highest levels 
of deviation below the standard level.  These items are concerned with both smartphone 
service delivery and relationships.  This rates more importantly to respondents not 
responsible for security, than it does to respondents who are responsible. 
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6.2.3 Responses by COBIT 4.1 domain 
Figure 25 displays a graph of each of the answer levels for only the question statements 
extracted from the planning and organising domain.  As highlighted earlier, responses from 
this domain received a higher level of average importance (0.99) for each question 
statement that those of the other domains. 
 
Figure 25 - PO importance levels 
Figure 26 displays a graph of each of the answer levels for only the question statements 
extracted from the delivery and support domain.  This domain provided the bulk of the 
question statements used in the questionnaire.  Responses for this domain generally 
received a lower level of average importance (0.77) than those of the planning and 
organising domain. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Plan and Organise Questions
Responsible for security requirements Not Responsible for security requirements
 
112 
 
 
Figure 26 - DS importance levels 
Figure 27 displays a graph of each of the answer levels for only the question statements 
extracted from the Monitor and Evaluate domain.  Responses for this domain generally 
received the lowest average level of importance (0.65) across each of the represented 
domains. 
 
Figure 27 - ME importance levels 
Only three of the four COBIT 4.1 domains are represented. The fourth domain (Acquire and 
Implement) does not target risk management as a primary objective.  In this section, the 
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statements from the planning and organising domain were found to contribute the highest 
average overall level of importance for all respondents. 
Table 15 below confirms that the separate population groups echo the sentiments of the 
overall averages highlighted above.  
Table 15 - Average level of importance by respondent and domain 
 Average level of importance 
Domain 
 
Respondent 
Plan and Organise Deliver and 
Support 
Monitor and 
evaluate 
Responsible for security 
requirements 
1.25 0.90 0.82 
Not Responsible for security 
requirements 
0.88 0.70 0.57 
6.3 Recommendations and Model 
The importance of protecting the information assets of an organisation is discussed 
extensively in Chapter 2.  If the security risks of smartphones are not adequately measured 
and mitigated, they could present a considerable risk to the organisation.  In order to ensure 
that adequate security is applied, management must be able to assess their current security 
position.   
This section recommends a model, which can be applied to measure the security maturity 
currently operating at a software consultancy organisation.  This model further provides a 
method of assessing the areas in which the current security solution does not adequately 
consider the security requirements for smartphone devices.  The model is based on both the 
primary data collected, and the secondary data sources. 
6.3.1 Purpose of the model 
The model provided in this section is intended to meet the following key characteristics: 
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 Measure the current security solution. 
 Identify the gaps that exist between this solution and one that encompasses 
smartphone security. 
6.3.2 Model composition 
The model for this research project is comprised of a number of components from the 
secondary data collected, and includes findings of the primary data collection.  These items 
are all subjected to a maturity model scale. 
6.3.2.1 The maturity scale 
The COBIT 4.1 framework recommends the use of maturity models, which help to identify 
gaps in capability, and are easily demonstrable to management.  Based on the key 
characteristics listed in the previous section, a maturity model based solution is best suited 
to providing the required gap analysis.  COBIT 4.1 provides six maturity levels, with 
respective definitions.  
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Table 16 - Maturity levels (IT Governance Institute, 2007b) 
Level Title Definition 
0 Non-Existent Complete lack of any recognisable processes.  The enterprise has not 
even recognised that there is an issue to be addressed. 
1 Initial / Ad Hoc There is evidence that the enterprise has recognised that the issues 
exist and need to be addressed.  There are, however, no standardised 
processes; instead, there are ad hoc approaches that tend to be applied 
on an individual or case-by-case basis.  The overall approach to 
management is disorganised. 
2 Repeatable but 
Intuitive 
Processes have developed to the stage where similar procedures are 
followed by different people undertaking the same task.  There is no 
formal training or communication of standard procedures, and 
responsibility is left to the individual.  There is a high degree of reliance 
on the knowledge of individuals and, therefore, errors are likely. 
3 Defined Process Procedures have been standardised and documented, and 
communicated through training.  It is mandated that these processes 
should be followed; however, it is unlikely that deviations will be 
detected.  The procedures themselves are not sophisticated but are the 
formalisation of existing practices. 
4 Managed and 
Measurable 
Management monitors and measures compliance with procedures and 
takes action where processes appear not to be working effectively.  
Processes are under constant improvement and provide good practice. 
Automation and tools are used in a limited or fragmented way. 
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5 Optimised Processes have been refined to a level of good practice, based on the 
results of continuous improvement and maturity modelling with other 
enterprises.  IT is used in an integrated way to automate the workflow, 
providing tools to improve quality and effectiveness, making the 
enterprise quick to adapt. 
This scale will provide the measurement and assessment component for the model.  The 
scale is simple enough for comprehension by non-technical management.  It provides a 
quick overview of areas in which smartphone security does not exhibit adequate protection. 
 
 
Figure 28 - Maturity scale 
Illustrated above in Figure 28, the six maturity scale columns run down the right hand side 
of the model.  For each of the components, a maturity level will be marked in one of these 
columns. 
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6.3.2.2 Measurable components 
The seventeen measurable components for the model are 
comprised of a combination of the seven smartphone risk items 
identified in the secondary data collection and ten items from 
the primary data collected.  In Chapter 3, seven smartphone risks 
identified by Botha, Furnell and Clarke (2009) were presented in 
Figure 9 in Chapter 2.  These are subsequently mapped to one of 
the IT Resource categories of the COBIT 4.1 framework.  This 
mapping is illustrated in Figure 15 in Chapter 3.  These items are 
included in the model, as they provide a measureable risk component across each of the 
smartphone security risks areas.  However, this does not fully satisfy the IT governance 
requirements of smartphone security, according the COBIT 4.1 process requirements. 
In order to ensure the solution satisfies smartphone security governance, items from the 
primary data collected, are incorporated into each of the categories.  The items added are 
comprised of responses from the primary data collected, as detailed below in Table 17.   
This is illustrated in Figure 30.  These items were also categorised under one of the IT 
Resource categories.  The application category now contains two sub-categories; the other 
three categories now each contain five sub-categories.  
  
Figure 29 - Measurable 
components 
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Figure 30 - Extended smartphone risk categorisation 
The items displayed with the darkened background, and italic font style, are the question 
statements added to the original smartphone risks (lighter background) from Figure 15.  
The items added from the primary data collection are from the five most important items to 
each population, and the items displaying the greatest deviation from the standard level of 
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deviation.  The following table (Table 17) indicates which question statements from the 
primary data collected are added to each category. 
The first column lists the population group, or groups, that highlighted the importance of 
the question statement.  The second column provides the question statement number.  The 
final two columns provide the category this item is added to, and the item name within that 
category. 
Table 17 - Items added to model from primary data 
Concerned group(s) Question 
statement 
Category Item 
Overall top five, respondents responsible for 
security & respondents not responsible for 
security 
3 (PO4) Application and 
Infrastructure 
System ownership 
Overall top five & respondents not responsible 
for security 
4 (PO4) Information Ownership 
Overall top five & respondents not responsible 
for security 
6 (PO4) People Risk awareness through control 
framework 
Respondents not responsible for security 8 (PO6) People Multi-level strategy awareness 
Respondents responsible for security & above 
standard deviation 
10 (PO9) People Multi-level strategy awareness 
Respondents responsible for security & above 
standard deviation 
11 (PO9) People Multi-level strategy awareness 
Respondents not responsible for security 13 (PO9) People Risk awareness through control 
framework 
Overall top five,  respondents responsible for 
security & above standard deviation 
14 (PO9) People Risk awareness through control 
framework 
Below standard deviation 20 (DS2) Infrastructure Supplier & Service delivery 
management 
Below standard deviation 23 (DS2) Infrastructure Supplier & Service delivery 
management 
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Below standard deviation 24 (DS2) Infrastructure Supplier & Service delivery 
management 
Respondents not responsible for security 25 (DS4) Information Restoration and Continuity 
Overall top five & respondents not responsible 
for security 
34 (DS4) Information Backup policy and scheme 
Respondents not responsible for security & 
Below standard deviation 
39 (DS5) People Rights and Privileges 
Respondents responsible for security & above 
standard deviation 
46 (DS11) Infrastructure Backup policy and scheme 
Above standard deviation 47 (DS11) Information Restoration and Continuity 
Below standard deviation 67 (ME5) People Governance Report 
 
6.3.2.3 Organisational maturity targets 
The model is designed for generic use across all types of software consultancies.  For each 
software consultancy, the environment within which they operate is likely to be very 
different.  For this reason, the model allows for a target maturity to be defined according to 
the specific requirements and priorities of the organisation that it is being used within.  A 
committee of senior managers and security officers should be assembled to define the 
target maturity level for the specific organisation utilising the model. 
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Figure 31 - Target maturity level 
Any maturity scores below the target level identify gaps between the existing security 
solution, and one that encompasses an adequate smartphone security. 
 
Figure 32 - The security maturity gap 
Figure 33 on the following page presents the smartphone security maturity model.  
Security solution including 
smartphone security.
Security solution as it is 
currently.
Smartphone security
Existing security
The final column of the smartphone security 
maturity model provides a space to capture the 
target maturity level.  This must be completed by a 
committee of senior managers and security 
officers, and is defined by each organisation 
according to its unique requirements and 
priorities.  It might not be feasible for an 
organisation to achieve higher than a particular 
maturity level for certain items. 
This area represents the gap which exists 
between the current security solution 
maturity measurements, and the target 
maturity solution. 
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6.3.3 Smartphone security maturity model 
Category Sub-category Maturity Measurement  
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Applications Mobile application security 
Mobile application security policies defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
System ownership 
Smartphone application owners identified 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
Applications maturity = (Sum of applications sub-categories) / 2 Maturity level (0 – 5) :  
Information Authentication 
Smartphone authentication policies defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Removable media 
Smartphone removable media security policies defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Ownership 
Smartphone information ownership awareness 
programmes implemented 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Restoration and continuity 
Smartphone restoration and continuity plans defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Backup policy and scheme 
Smartphone data backup policy and scheme defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
Information maturity = (Sum of information sub-categories) / 5 Maturity level (0 – 5) :  
Infrastructure Configuration 
Smartphone configuration policies defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Communication 
Smartphone recommended communication polices 
defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Physical threat 
Smartphone physical threat analysis performed 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 System ownership 
Smartphone system ownership (infrastructure) is defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Supplier & Service delivery management 
Smartphone supplier and service delivery polices defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
Infrastructure maturity = (Sum of infrastructure sub-categories) / 5 Maturity level (0 – 5) :  
People Users 
User awareness programmes implemented for 
smartphone security 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Risk awareness control framework 
Risk awareness is defined through a smartphone security 
control framework 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Multi-level strategy awareness 
Business and functional smartphone strategies defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Rights and Privileges 
Smartphone user rights and privileges defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
 Governance Report 
A periodic governance report provides performance 
feedback to smartphone users 
0 1 2 3 4 5  
People maturity = (Sum of  the people sub-categories) / 5 Maturity level (0 – 5) :   
Overall organisational smartphone security maturity 
(Sum of the categories) / 4 
Maturity level (0 – 5) : 
 
Figure 33- The smartphone security maturity model 
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The model should be used as a score sheet to assess the maturity of the organisational 
smartphone security maturity.  Through each of the categories, each sub-category must be 
allocated a maturity level.  Once all the sub-categories are allocated a maturity level, the 
category itself can be allocated a category maturity.  This can be done by dividing the sum of 
the maturity levels by the amount of sub-categories.  For example, in Table 18 below, the 
applications category has been completed, with a set of example target maturities 
(randomly selected) provided.   
Table 18 - Category maturity example 
Category Sub-category Maturity Measurement  
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Applications Mobile application security 
Mobile application security policies defined 
0 1 2 3 4 5 4 
System ownership 
Smartphone application owners identified 
0 1 2 3 4 5 4 
Applications maturity = (Sum of applications sub-categories) / 2 Maturity level (0 – 5) :        2.5 4 
The score for the applications maturity level is calculated as follows: 
Applications maturity = (2 + 3 ) / 2 = 2.5 
The maturity gap for this section is calculated as follows: 
Applications maturity gap = (actual - target) = (2.5 – 4) = -1.5 
Negative values indicate a gap; positive values indicate that maturity is currently above the 
target level. 
Finally, if required, an overall organisational smartphone security maturity can be calculated 
by dividing the sum of all of the category maturities by four (the amount of categories).  This 
 
124 
 
test can be completed quarterly, annually or as often as the organisation wishes to assess its 
smartphone security maturity. 
6.3.3.1 Recommended measurement process 
The recommended process for measuring the smartphone security maturity is illustrated in 
Figure 34.  Begin by using the maturity model to perform an initial measurement, 
establishing the maturity scores as an initial benchmark.  This benchmark is the current 
security maturity of the organisation.  In conjunction, initial maturity targets must be set by 
senior managers and security officers. 
Once a benchmark is established, gaps can be identified by comparing maturity levels to 
target maturity levels.  A task team or individual, depending on the organisation, can be 
established in order to react to the security gaps identified.  Recommended actions and 
policies must be defined and implemented (React), in order to move the current 
smartphone security maturity levels toward target levels. 
Once this is completed, a new measurement using the model must be completed.  Any 
items, which are now equal to, or above the target maturity level, must be incorporated into 
a maintenance plan.  A new benchmark must be set and new gaps must be identified. The 
cycle should be repeated continuously according to the requirements of the organisation. 
Initial 
Measurement
Establish
Benchmark
Identify Gaps
ReactMeasureMaintain
Set Maturity 
Targets
 
Figure 34 - The maturity measurement cycle 
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This measurement cycle is intended to provide one example of a recommended usage 
pattern for the model.  Each organisation might customise this workflow according to their 
own strategic or legislative requirements.   
Through repetitive measurement cycles, employee awareness of the smartphone security 
requirements will constantly become reinforced and eventually form a part of the security 
culture. 
 
Once smartphone security becomes part of the organisational culture, an alignment 
between business and smartphone security objectives will begin to occur. 
6.3.4 Strategic alignment of business and smartphone security objectives 
By ensuring that each of the categories moves towards optimised maturity, each of the 
gradients of the awareness boundary model (detailed in Figure 4 in Chapter 2) will begin 
moving in a similar direction.  They will then be working together to resist both economic 
failure and unacceptable workload.  Together, their efforts to reach functional acceptance 
will be far greater and with rigid security in place, the counter gradients will ensure that 
functional acceptance is never breached. 
Awareness Reinforcement Culture
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This represents an employee base, which is in tune with the requirements of the 
organisation.  At the same time, management are aware of security requirements.  Both 
groups are also aligned with the organisational security requirements, as opposed to only 
resisting their individual boundaries. 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the results from the primary data collection were analysed.  The results were 
analysed as a whole, and then separately by population groups defined by whether or not 
the respondent was responsible for security at their organisation.  Interestingly there 
appears to be very little difference in the perception of smartphone security requirements 
between both population groups.  Sacco (2008) pointed out that a study by CompTIA 
pointed out that less than a third of organisations had implemented measures to raise 
security awareness.  This appears to correlate to the results of this study as it was found 
that employees who are responsible for security are similarly unconcerned about the 
security weaknesses of smartphone devices, as those respondents who indicated that they 
Boundary of 
functional 
acceptance 
Boundary of 
Unacceptable 
workload 
Boundary of Economic 
failure 
Respondents who indicated that 
they were responsible for 
security requirements 
Respondents who indicated 
that they were NOT responsible 
for security requirements 
 
Counter gradient from 
awareness campaigns 
 
Unified, effort away 
from economic failure 
and unacceptable 
workload 
 
Figure 35 -  Awareness boundary model, unified effort – adapted from Rasmussen (1997) 
Controls such as those 
suggested by COBIT 
4.1 and ISO27002 
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were not responsible.  Dunn (2007) agrees suggesting that smartphone security is a largely 
neglected area. From the results it would seem as though all employees, regardless of their 
responsibility for security at their organisations, view smartphone risks as negligible. 
The results included a comparison between the two population groups in the form of a 
standard deviation test.  This concluded that respondents share similar perceptions of 
importance for certain components of smartphone security, with only one third of the score 
differences falling outside of standard deviation. 
The final analysis performed was across each of the relevant COBIT 4.1 domains in order to 
establish which domain was the most important to respondents.  The results point to the 
Planning and Organising domain as being the most relevant to smartphone security. 
The chapter concluded with the model and recommendations.  The purpose of the model is 
detailed before the actual model is provided.  A detailed explanation of the maturity scale 
and measureable components of the model is provided.  This included a recommended 
usage cycle. 
This chapter highlighted the question statements that gained the highest importance levels 
across each of the population splits.  From this, items that are important to each of the 
groups, even where they might disagree, can receive attention in the maturity 
measurement.  This is important in ensuring that the requirements of each of these groups 
are satisfied.  Once all population groups are satisfied, the chance of successfully gaining 
support for a smartphone security initiative is much higher.  Chapter 7, the final chapter, 
provides the conclusion to this research project.  
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7.1 Background 
This chapter will provide a conclusive discussion to this research project.  A brief background 
of the research will be presented followed the contribution made.  In this section, an 
overview of all the chapters will be discussed.  An evaluation of the research outcomes 
follows in section 7.3.   
The following section, 7.4 provides future research recommendations.  These 
recommendations provide direction in which future research could build on the work of this 
project.  Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in section 7.5. 
Proliferation of smartphones is set to catch many software consultancy organisations off-
guard.  While many organisations might take extreme measures to mitigate this risk, such as 
banning the use of smartphones for processing of organisational information, the potential 
strategic advantage of these devices cannot be overlooked. 
The literature consulted in this research project suggests that organisations have not 
focused adequate resources on ensuring that security for these devices is at an acceptable 
level.  In Chapter 3, it was established that security for other platforms has gradually 
matured over time; however, smartphone security remains relatively immature in 
comparison.  This not only poses a real threat to an expensive piece of equipment (the 
physical device), but also puts an increasing amount of organisational information at risk. 
In Chapter 2, the importance of information as an asset to the organisation is discussed.  It 
was noted that organisations are increasingly reliant on confidential, reliable and readily 
available sources of strategic information.  In order to satisfy this appetite for information 
employees have begun to move processing of this information to mobile smartphone 
devices.  An information security driven organisational culture, provides a powerful method 
of ensuring that employees subscribe to the requirements of information security.   This was 
found to provide employees with a sense of awareness of the requirements of information 
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security. Finally, Chapter 2 detailed the characteristics of a typical software consultancy 
worker. 
In Chapter 3, the smartphone was subjected to a discussion of its security risk areas.  
Smartphones, because of their relatively young lifespan, were found to possess a number of 
areas in which their security level has not reached a similar level of maturity, as that found 
in regular computing devices.  A definition for a smartphone device was provided, 
specifically for this research project, in order to minimise confusion. 
At the end of Chapter 3, the specific risks exposed by smartphones were covered in detail.  
This covered the threat to information security in software consultancies, introduce by the 
proliferation of the smartphone.  Chapter 4 provided the final chapter for the literature 
review section of this research project.  In this section a base framework from which the 
research solution could be developed was introduced.   
Chapter 4 introduced two major security frameworks.  These frameworks provide an 
excellent platform to build a solution to the problem area.  The core of the solution was 
achieved by decomposing the COBIT 4.1 framework, into parts that targeted risk 
management as a primary objective.  Each of the smartphone security risk areas was 
mapped to a resource area of the COBIT 4.1 framework.  Finally, the ISO27002 standards 
were mapped to the COBIT 4.1 components. 
In Chapter 5, the research methodology was established to favour the interpretive 
approach.  A questionnaire, as part of multiple individual case studies, provided an ideal 
research instrument.  Both quantitative and qualitative methods were deployed in order to 
gain insight into the problem area.  This was achieved by quantifying the results from the 
Linkert Scale responses of each case study. 
Using a database in conjunction with a spreadsheet tool provided a method of dissecting 
and analysing multiple combinations of the results.  The results were filtered based on the 
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respondents’ responsibility for security at their organisation.  Clear trends and patterns 
were identified.  These were then analysed and incorporated into the research model.  The 
findings and recommendations were presented in Chapter 6. 
The resulting outcome of this research project is a model, which can be used to measure the 
smartphone security maturity of a software consultancy organisation.  The following section 
will highlight the contributions made by the research project. 
7.2 The contribution made by this research project  
It was established that organisational smartphone security levels must be improved to 
prevent vulnerabilities or threats to information security.  Existing security solutions were 
found to be lacking adequate security for smartphone devices.  Employees were found to be 
driving an explosion of smartphone devices into the workplace.  While this tendency is not 
confined to just the software consultancy organisation, due to the nature of this 
organisation it is set to suffer considerable harm in the event of a security breach.  The 
reason for this is because of the heavy dependence on information and information 
workers, at this type of organisation. 
A significant problem that required attention was that there was no clear and concise model 
for measuring which areas of an organisation’s current security solution were inadequately 
prepared, for the risks introduced by smartphone devices.  From this research project, a 
model has been presented which seeks to fulfil this requirement.  Software consultancy 
organisations can now utilise this model in order to determine which areas of smartphone 
security need to be adequately addressed. 
Smaller software consultancies are able to set separate maturity targets to larger 
consultancies with bigger budgets and requirements, using the same model.  This model can 
be customised to measure the maturity requirements at any software consultancy by 
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adjusting the target maturities.  Furthermore, this model provides a methodology of 
measuring progress and areas, which have regressed. 
This model provides each of the most important measurable factors for adequate 
smartphone security assessment.  The model takes the form of a maturity measurement 
tool.  One that can be completed by security personnel, and easily understood by executive 
managers who might not be proficient in the area. 
This research project highlighted areas of smartphone security, which were important to the 
following respondents: 
 Users responsible for security at their organisations. 
 Users not responsible for security at their organisations. 
 Both groups (collectively). 
Procedures of the COBIT 4.1 framework which targeted risk management as a primary 
objective were identified.  Each of the objectives of the ISO27002 standard which mapped 
to these procedures were also identified.  This provided a detailed starting point, from 
which security users are able to begin implementing security requirements.  The planning 
and organising domain of the COBIT 4.1 framework was found to be the most important to 
all respondents. 
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Figure 36 - Research project outcomes 
In Figure 36 above highlights key chapters of this research project are presented where they 
focus on one of the major principles of the COBIT 4.1 framework. 
7.3 An evaluation of the research outcomes 
At the onset of this research project, three research questions were provided in section 1.3 
and 1.4.  These questions have remained the guiding focus, for the direction in which every 
step of this project has taken.  Topics which were not found to be adding value to one of 
these questions were either removed or refocused.  In order to evaluate the success of this 
research project, an assessment of each of these questions was undertaken.  If each of 
these questions has been answered, then the research project has fulfilled its original 
intentions. 
Enterprise 
information and its 
security are 
addressed in  
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 provided 
the risk to each IT 
resource introduced 
through smartphone 
usage 
Business requirements were defined 
specifically for smartphones in 
software consultancies, in Chapter 2. 
Using the model provided in Chapter 6, a software consultancy can improve the 
security of the information delivered from smartphones in response to business 
requirements.  By constantly measuring the maturity of security within the 
organisation, the information used by smartphones in IT processes can be 
delivered more securely. 
Chapter 4 details 
the COBIT 4.1 
framework, and 
supporting policies 
from the ISO 27002 
standards set 
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The primary research question is: 
How can a software consultancy organisation measure the vulnerability gaps that 
exist between its existing security solution, and a smartphone security solution so it 
conforms to both the COBIT 4.1 framework and the ISO27002 standards? 
This question is asked as the primary question for this study.  The answer to this question 
forms the primary output for the research project.  In response, a model was developed, 
which seeks to provide the answer to this question.  The model allows a software 
consultancy to measure any gaps that exist between its current security solution and one 
that encompasses components from both the COBIT 4.1 framework and ISO27002 
standards.  Through the model, a solution has been provided which satisfies this question. 
Secondary research questions directly related to the primary question were identified.  
These questions complemented the solution and formed a significant part of the research 
project. 
The first research sub-question is: 
What are the specific security requirements of smartphones in software consultancy 
organisations? 
By combining the findings of both the primary and secondary data collection, a specific set 
of security requirements of smartphones, within software consultancy organisations, was 
established.  The literature survey identified generic risk areas for smartphone devices, 
while the primary data collected from each of the case study respondents provided an 
insight into the specific requirements of software consultancies. 
The question asks what the specific security requirements of smartphones in software 
consultancies are.  The findings of the empirical study provide ample evidence of the 
specific requirements for all areas of risk management of smartphone devices.  This 
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question has been comprehensively covered from a generic smartphone security 
requirement level, and all the way through to the specific requirements of software 
consultancy organisations. 
Seven specific requirements were identified in Chapter 3.  The specific requirements were 
found to consist of the following: 
 Mobile application security 
 Authentication 
 Removable media 
 Configuration 
 Communication 
 Physical threat 
 Users  
The second research sub-question is: 
What components from the COBIT 4.1 framework and ISO27002 standards are most 
significant to a security solution that includes smartphone security? 
This question seeks to identify only the components, from each of the frameworks, which 
are significant to smartphone security.  In order to achieve this, the COBIT 4.1 framework 
processes that target risk management as a primary objective were identified.  These 
processes were then mapped to the ISO27002 control objectives using the official mapping 
document provided by COBIT 4.1. 
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Figure 37 - Components identified 
From this, the relevant objectives from the ISO27002 standard were identified.  Finally, the 
activity statements for each of these COBIT 4.1 processes were adapted to place the 
smartphone as the focus of each activity.  This allowed the most significant components to 
be identified using a questionnaire as part of each of the case studies conducted.   
Items from the following COBIT 4.1 processes were identified for incorporation into the 
model: PO4, PO6, PO9 DS2, DS4, DS5, DS11 and ME5.  ISO27002 items mapped to these 
processes are listed in   
The most relevant components to smartphone 
security were combined from both the primary and 
secondary data sources.  These items are the 
measurable component of the maturity model. 
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Table 6.  Thus, this sub-question has been successfully answered in this research. 
The third research sub-question was: 
How can the gap between an existing security solution and one that conforms to both 
COBIT 4.1 and ISO27002 be measured in a software consultancy organisation? 
The maturity measurement scale provided in the research model allows software 
consultancy organisations to measure their current security solution as it is.  Targets can be 
set to give the organisation an idea of where it needs to be, in order to provide adequate 
levels of smartphone security.  When used as part of a continuous measurement and 
improvement programme, such as the recommended measurement process, this provides a 
formidable method of closing such a gap. 
 
Figure 38 - Measuring maturity gaps 
Each of the questions set out at the onset of this research have therefore been adequately 
addressed by the research project. 
7.4 Directions for future research 
There were many directions in which this research project might have digressed, had the 
main research question not maintained focus.  This section will detail a number of areas in 
which future research might be able to build upon this research project. 
By providing the ability for the organisation to set its 
own targets, it becomes easy for that organisation to 
clearly define the gaps that exist between its current 
security maturity and the target maturity. 
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The research model provides a method of measuring the maturity level of various 
components of smartphone security.  Future research could be focused towards identifying 
the COBIT 4.1 processes, and ISO27002 control objectives, which best raise the maturity 
level of each of the measurable items of the model.  This would provide users, of the model, 
with a defined set of activities that could be performed to assist in archiving target maturity 
for that measureable. 
Providing specific instructions for increasing the maturity of each of the measureable 
components of the maturity model is a natural progression for this research topic.  Specific 
actionable instructions would remove the requirement of interpreting the instructions of 
the COBIT 4.1 framework, and ISO27002 standard, for smartphone security. 
Future research might be directed at translating each of the action statements of the COBIT 
4.1 processes and ISO27002 control objectives to specifically target smartphone security.  
These frameworks provide generic security recommendations, often difficult to apply to 
smartphone security requirements.  Research in this area might assist in providing specific 
instruction for smartphone security so that compliance with these framework 
recommendations is achieved. 
Future research could be directed at refining the model through a deeper analysis of the 
recommendations of the ISO27002 processes provided in Chapter 4.  This would provide a 
detailed set of instructions for the ‘react’ component of the recommended maturity 
process. 
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Figure 39 – Measurement process enhancements 
Employee awareness is highlighted as a critical factor in ensuring the success of a security 
solution.  Future research could be targeted at formulating strategies to enhance employee 
awareness of the security measurable highlighted in the model.  The ability to measure 
these components is provided in the model, and people form a core part of the measurable 
components.  However, maintaining the awareness of security in employees, and translating 
this into a security culture, is an excellent direction in which future research could be 
focused. 
In conclusion, the following suggested directions for future research are: 
 Identifying components from each of the framework documents most significant to 
maturing each of the measureable components. 
 Translate each actionable recommendation of both frameworks, such that they 
provide smartphone specific security recommendations. 
 Enhance the model further through the recommendations of the processes from the 
ISO27002 standard, which were identified in Chapter 4. 
 Employee awareness of the purpose and requirements of the model and its 
components as a direction of future study. 
The ‘react’ and 
‘maintain’ portions of 
the recommended 
measurement process 
could be addressed 
more thoroughly in 
future research. 
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7.5 Concluding note 
This research project provided a model for measuring the maturity of smartphone security 
in software consultancy organisations.  This model provides an excellent method of 
measuring the maturity of smartphone security at these organisations.  Software 
consultancy organisations can use this model to identify which components of their 
smartphone security are not meeting their target maturity level. 
Ensuring that smartphones are not a weak link in the chain of security at an organisation is 
paramount to the protection of the information at that organisation.  Regular assessment of 
all security components is vital in ensuring an ongoing security solution.  Using the model 
provided by this research project, the smartphone component is capable of active ongoing 
maturity measurement. 
Finally, employees, management, clients and customers will only benefit by efforts to 
improve smartphone security.  Through the work of this research project, smartphone 
security in software consultancies can be both measured and improved.  Software 
consultancies can now embrace this innovative and exciting technological advancement, 
without fearing it.   
  
 
141 
 
Reference list 
Al Aboodi, S. S. (2006). A New Approach for Assessing the Maturity of Information Security. 
Information Systems Control Journal , 3 (1), 1-4. 
Albrechtsen, E. (2007). A qualitative study of users’ view on information security. 
Computers and Security , 26 (4), 276-289. 
Best, J. (2006, February 13). Analysis: What is a smart phone? Retrieved August 14, 2008, 
from Silicon.com: 
http://networks.silicon.com/mobile/0,39024665,39156391,00.htm 
Botha, R., Furnell, S., & Clarke, N. (2009). From desktop to mobile: Examining the security 
experience. Computers & Security , 28 (3-4), 130-137. 
Brotby, K. (2007). Information Security Governance: Who Needs It? Information Systems 
Control Journal , 2 (1), 1-2. 
Clarke, N., & Furnell, S. (2007). Advanced user authentication for mobile devices. 
Computers and Security , 26 (2), 109-119. 
Collis, J., & Hussey, R. (2003). Business Research: A practical guide for undergraduate and 
postgraduate students (2nd Edition ed.). New York: Palgrove Macmillan. 
Congdon, J., & Dunham, A. (1999). Defining the Beginning:The Importance of Research 
Design. (K. Eckert, K. Bjorndal, F. Abreu-Grobois, & M. Donnelly, Eds.) Research and 
Management Techniques for the Conservation of Sea Turtles , 1, pp. 1-5. 
Davis, A. (2006). Information security can enable mobile working. Infosecurity Today , 3 (4), 
42. 
Dingsøyr, T. (2002). Knowledge Management in Medium-Sized Software Consulting 
Companies. Empirical Software Engineering , 7 (4), 383-386. 
Doherty, N., & Fulford, H. (2006). Aligning the information security policy with the strategic 
information systems plan. Computers and Security , 25 (1), 55-63. 
 
142 
 
Dunn, D. (2007). Mobility: Securing devices on the run. (P. Watson, E. Feretic, & E. Cone, 
Eds.) Innovations , 2007 (5), pp. 18-19. 
Elgan, M. (2007, March 12). It's time we stopped talking about "smartphones". Retrieved 
May 05, 2009, from techworld.com: 
http://www.techworld.com/mobility/features/index.cfm?featureid=3204 
Furnell, S. (2005). Handheld hazards: The rise of malware on mobile devices. Computer 
Fraud & Security , 2005 (5), 4-8. 
Furnell, S., & Thomson, K.-L. (2009). Recognising the varying user acceptance of IT security. 
Computer Fraud & Security (2), 5-10. 
Furnell, S., Jusoh, A., & Katsabas, D. (2006). The challenges of understanding and using 
security: A survey of end-users. Computers and Security , 25 (1), 27-35. 
Garbani, J.-P., Koetzle, L., & Powell, T. (2006, April 26). ITIL, CoBIT and ISO: Overlap Or 
Complement? Retrieved July 11, 2008, from IT Service Today: 
http://itservicetoday.blogs.com/itil/2006/04/itil_cobit_and_.html 
Gartner. (2009). Gartner Glossary. Retrieved December 7, 2009, from Gartner: 
http://www.gartner.com/6_help/glossary/GlossaryS.jsp 
Greenhalgh, T., & Taylor, R. (1997, September 20). How to read a paper: Papers that go 
beyond numbers (qualitative research). Retrieved August 05, 2008, from BMJ: 
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/315/7110/740 
Hughes, M., & Stanton, R. (2006). Winning security policy acceptance. Computer Fraud & 
Security , 2006 (5), 17-19. 
Hunter, P. (2008, June 6). Central support goes into the field. Retrieved December 16, 2009, 
from The Institution of Engineering and Technology: 
http://kn.theiet.org/magazine/issues/0801/mobile.cfm 
Isaksen, A. (2004). Knowledge-based Clusters and Urban Location: The Clustering of 
Software Consultancy in Oslo. Urban Studies , 41 (5/6), 1157-1174. 
 
143 
 
IsecT Ltd. (2008). ISO/IEC 27002 code of practice. Retrieved August 2, 2009, from isect.com: 
http://www.iso27001security.com/html/27002.html#39controlObjectives 
ISO 17799 News. (2006). ISO17799 News. A Short History of ISO 17799. Retrieved June 24, 
2009, from ISO 17799 News: http://17799-news.the-hamster.com/issue10-
news7.htm 
IT Governance Institute. (2007b). COBIT 4.1. Rolling Meadows: IT Governance Institute. 
IT Governance Institute. (2007a). COBIT 4.1 Executive Summary. Rolling Meadows, Illinois, 
USA. 
IT Governance institute. (2006). Mapping of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 with COBIT 4.0. Rolling 
Meadows, IL: IT Governance institute. 
Johnson, J. (2009). Memory Cards for Your PDA; Expand Your PDA's Storage Potential. 
Retrieved July 21, 2009, from About.com: 
http://palmtops.about.com/od/accessoriesperipherials/ss/flashcards.htm 
Jürjens, J., Schrek, J., & Bartmann, P. (2008). Model-based Security Analysis for Mobile 
Communications. International Conference on Software Engineering (pp. 683-692). 
Leipzig, Germany: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 
Karyda, M., Kiountouzis, E., & Kokolakis, S. (2005). Information systems security policies: a 
contextual perspective. Computers and Security , 24 (3), 246-260. 
Khokhar, R. (2006). Smartphones – a call for better safety on the move. Network Security , 
2006 (4), 6-7. 
Kooser, A. C. (2007, August). Safe Trip. Entrepreneur Magazine , 1, p. 28. 
Kritzinger, E., & Smith, E. (2008). Information security management: An information 
security retrieval and awareness model for industry. Computers and Security , 27 (5-
6), 224-231. 
Kruger, H. A., & Kearny, W. D. (2008). Consensus ranking – An ICT security awareness case 
study. Computers and Security , 27 (7-8), 254-159. 
 
144 
 
Liginlal, D., Sim, I., & Khansa, L. (2009). How significant is human error as a cause of privacy 
breaches? An empirical study and a framework for error management. Computers 
and Security , 28 (3-4), 215-228. 
Lim, E. (2007, December). Security policies must keep pace with business mobility. Network 
World Asia , December 2007, p. 12. 
Mahoney, C. (2009, January). Talk Generation Y's Language. HR Magazine , January 2009, p. 
25. 
Martins, A., & Eloff, J. (2001). Information security culture. Retrieved February 18, 2009, 
from Rand Afrikaans University: http://etd.rau.ac.za/theses/available/etd-
04292004-110222/restricted/SEC2002FinalVersion.pdf 
McCall, M. (2006, April 01). Industry grapples with smartphone security. Retrieved August 
05, 2008, from Wirelessweek.com: http://www.wirelessweek.com/industry-
grapples-with-smartphone.aspx 
Morgan, G., & Smircich, L. (1980). The case for qualitative research. The academy of 
management review , 5 (4), 491-500. 
Musaji, Y. (2006). A Holistic Definition of IT Security—Part 2. Infromation Controls Journal 
(ISACA) . 
Myers, M. D. (1997, May 20). Qualitative Research in Information Systems. Retrieved July 
22, 2008, from MISQ Discovery: http://www.misq.org/discovery/MISQD_isworld/ 
Neill, J. (2006, July 05). Analysis of Professional Literature Class 6: Qualitative Research I. 
Retrieved August 05, 2008, from Wilderdom.com: 
http://www.wilderdom.com/OEcourses/PROFLIT/Class6Qualitative1.htm 
Olivier, M. (2004). Infromation Technology Research (2nd Edition ed.). Pretoria, South 
Africa: Van Schaik. 
Olzak, T. (2006, April). Strengthen Security with an Effective Security Awareness Program. 
Retrieved February 15, 2009, from Adventuresinsecurity.com: 
http://adventuresinsecurity.com/Papers/Build_a_Security_Awareness_Program.pdf 
 
145 
 
Pahl, A. (2009, April/May). The business case for smartphones. Retrieved May 26, 2009, 
from titletown.org: http://www.titletown.org/resources/bbjtechwatch.pdf 
Pironti, J. (2005, April). Minimizing New Risks the Old-Fashioned Way. Wireless Week , April 
2005, p. 31. 
Post, G. V., & Kagan, A. (2007). Evalutating information security tradeoffs: Restricting access 
can interfere with user tasks. Computers and Security , 26 (3), 229 - 237. 
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem. Safety 
Science , 27 (2), 183-213. 
Reardon, M. (2007, November 13). Smartphone sales skyrocket. Retrieved July 02, 2008, 
from CNet.com: http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9816072-7.html 
Ruighaver, A. B., Maynard, S. B., & Chang, S. (2007). Organisational security culture: 
Extending the end-user perspective. Computers and Security , 26 (1), 56-62. 
Sacco, A. I. (2008, February 15). Remote workers pose rising security threat. CIO , 21 (9), p. 
12. 
Sharma, B. (2007). Mobile management beyond the office walls. Siliconindia , July 2007, 28-
29. 
Standards South Africa. (2005). SANS 17799:2005. Pretoria: Standards South Africa. 
Stanley, R. (2004). Security, Audit and Control Issues for Managing Risk in the Wireless LAN 
Environment. Infromation Systems Control Journal , 3 (1). 
Stephen, L. (1868). Cornhill Magazine (Vol. XVII). London: Smith, Elder & Co. 
Sweren, S. H. (2006). ISO 17799: Then, Now and in the Future. Information Systems Control 
Journal , 1 (1), 34-37. 
Tellis, W. (1997). Introduction to case study. The Qualitative Report , 3 (2), 1. 
The centre for public service innovation. (2003). Government unplugged. South African 
Government, State Information Technology Agency. World Wide Worx. 
 
146 
 
Yeo, V. (2008, April 14). Tech-savvy workers to make IT decisions in future. Retrieved July 
11, 2008, from Silicon.com: 
http://management.silicon.com/careers/0,39024671,39187852,00.htm 
Yusuf, M. (2006). A Holistic Definition of IT Security. Information Systems Control Journal , 3 
(1). 
 
  
 
147 
 
Glossary 
Word Meaning 
Acceptance The act of accepting with approval; favourable reception 
Accessibility The quality of being at hand when needed 
Authentication Validating the authenticity of something or someone 
Availability  The quality of being at hand when needed 
Confidentiality Discretion in keeping secret information 
Control  The activity of managing or exerting control over something 
Deviation  A variation that deviates from the standard or norm 
Domain The content of a particular field of knowledge 
Framework A hypothetical description of a complex entity or process 
Governance The act of governing; exercising authority 
Integrity An undivided or unbroken completeness or totality with nothing wanting 
Maturity State of being mature; full development 
Paradigm 
The generally accepted perspective of a particular discipline at a given 
time 
Patch (software) A short set of commands to correct a bug in a computer program 
PIN A number you choose and use to gain access to various accounts 
Qualitative  Relating to or involving comparisons based on qualities 
Quantitative  Relating to the measurement of quantity 
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Appendix A – Question statements 
Question 
number 
COBIT 
process 
Original question statement and altered statement below in bold 
1 PO4 Establish IT organisational structure, including committees and linkages to the 
stakeholders and vendors. 
 
An IT organisational structure, including committees and linkages to smartphone 
stakeholders and smartphone vendors, has been established. 
2 PO4 Design an IT process framework. 
 
A smartphone process framework has been developed. 
3 PO4 Identify system owners. 
 
Smartphone system owners have been identified. 
4 PO4 Identify data owners. 
 
Smartphone users are aware of who owns the data processed and stored on their 
device. 
5 PO4 Establish and implement IT roles and responsibilities, including supervision and 
segregation of duties. 
 
IT roles and responsibilities have been established, that include the supervision 
and segregation of duties when using smartphones and smartphone applications. 
6 PO6 Establish and maintain an IT control environment and framework. 
 
A smartphone control environment and framework has been established, and is 
being maintained. 
7 PO6 Develop and maintain IT policies. 
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Smartphone policies have been developed and are being maintained. 
8 PO6 Communicate the IT control framework and IT objectives and direction. 
 
Smartphone control  frameworks, objectives and direction have been 
communicated to smartphone users. 
9 PO9 Determine risk management alignment (e.g., assess risk). 
 
A smartphone risk assessment (risk management alignment) has been 
determined. 
10 PO9 Understand relevant strategic business objectives. 
 
The relative strategic business objectives of smartphones are understood. 
11 PO9 Understand relevant business process objectives. 
 
Relevant smartphone business process objectives are understood. 
12 PO9 Identify internal IT objectives, and establish risk context. 
 
The internal objectives of smartphones have been identified, and a smartphone 
risk context has been established. 
13 PO9 Identify events associated with objectives 
 
Events associated with smartphone objectives have been identified 
14 PO9 Assess risk associated with events. 
 
Smartphone risks associated with events have been assessed. 
15 PO9 Evaluate and select risk responses. 
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Smartphone risks responses have been selected and evaluated. 
16 PO9 Prioritise and plan control activities. 
 
Smartphone control objectives have been planned and prioritised. 
17 PO9 Approve and ensure funding for risk action plans. 
 
Funding for smartphone risk action plans has been approved and ensured. 
18 PO9 Maintain and monitor a risk action plan. 
 
A smartphone risk action plan is being maintained and monitored. 
19 DS2 Identify and categorise third-party service relationships. 
 
Third party smartphone service relationships have been identified and 
categorised. 
20 DS2 Define and document supplier management processes. 
 
Smartphone supplier management processes have been defined and 
documented. 
21 DS2 Establish supplier evaluation and selection policies and procedures. 
 
Smartphone supplier evaluation and selection policies and procedures have been 
established 
22 DS2 Identify, assess and mitigate supplier risks. 
 
Smartphone supplier risks have been identified and mitigated. 
23 DS2 Monitor supplier service delivery. 
 
Smartphone supplier service delivery is monitored. 
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24 DS2 Evaluate long-term goals of the service relationship for all stakeholders. 
 
The long-term goals of the smartphone service relationship for all stakeholders 
has been evaluated. 
25 DS4 Develop an IT continuity framework. 
 
An IT continuity framework has been developed, and this framework includes 
smartphones. 
26 DS4 Conduct a business impact analysis and risk assessment. 
 
A business impact analysis and risk assessment has been conducted for 
smartphone devices. 
27 DS4 Develop and maintain IT continuity plans. 
 
IT Continuity plans which include the role of smartphones, have been developed, 
and are being maintained. 
28 DS4 Identify and categorise IT resources based on recovery objectives. 
 
Smartphone resources that are based on recovery objectives, have been 
identified and categorised. 
29 DS4 Define and execute change control procedures to ensure that the IT continuity plan 
is current. 
 
Change control procedures that ensure the role of smartphones in the IT 
continuity plan are current, have been defined, and are being followed. 
30 DS4 Regularly test the IT continuity plan. 
 
The smartphone component of the IT Continuity plan is regularly tested. 
31 DS4 Develop a follow-on action plan from test results. 
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A follow-on action plan for smartphones from test results has been developed. 
32 DS4 Plan and conduct IT continuity training. 
 
The role of smartphones in IT Continuity training is planned for and conducted. 
33 DS4 Plan IT services recovery and resumption. 
 
The role of smartphones in IT services recovery and resumption has been planned 
for. 
34 DS4 Plan and implement backup storage and protection. 
 
Smartphone information backup storage and protection has been planned for and 
implemented. 
35 DS4 Establish procedures for conducting post-resumption reviews. 
 
Procedures for conducting post-resumption reviews of the role of smartphones 
have been established. 
36 DS5 Define and maintain an IT security plan. 
 
The role of smartphones is defined in an IT security plan. 
37 DS5 Define, establish and operate an identity (account) management process. 
 
An identity management process for smartphone devices has been defined and 
established, and is in operation. 
38 DS5 Monitor potential and actual security incidents. 
 
Potential and actual smartphone security incidents are being monitored. 
39 DS5 Periodically review and validate user access rights and privileges. 
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Smartphone user access rights and privileges are periodically reviewed and 
validated. 
40 DS5 Establish and maintain procedures for maintaining and safeguarding cryptographic 
keys. 
 
Procedures for maintaining and safeguarding cryptographic keys used for 
smartphone information have been established and are being maintained. 
41 DS5 Implement and maintain technical and procedural controls to protect information 
flows across networks. 
 
Technical and procedural controls to protect the flow of information from 
smartphones across networks, are implemented and are being maintained. 
42 DS5 Conduct regular vulnerability assessments. 
 
Smartphone vulnerability assessments are regularly conducted. 
43 DS11 Translate data storage and retention requirements into procedures. 
 
Smartphone information data storage and retention requirements have been 
translated into procedures. 
44 DS11 Define, maintain and implement procedures to manage the media library. 
 
Procedures to maintain the smartphone media library have been defined, 
maintained and implemented. 
45 DS11 Define, maintain and implement procedures for secure disposal of media and 
equipment 
 
Procedures for the secure disposal of smartphone media and equipment have 
been defined, maintained and implemented. 
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46 DS11 Back up data according to scheme. 
 
Smartphone data is backed up according to scheme. 
47 DS11 Define, maintain and implement procedures for data restoration. 
 
Procedures for smartphone data restoration have been defined, maintained and 
implemented. 
48 DS12 Define the required level of physical protection. 
 
The required level of physical protection of smartphone devices has been defined. 
49 DS12 Implement physical environment measures. 
 
Measures have been implemented within the physical environment to mitigate 
smartphone risk. 
50 DS12 Define and implement procedures for physical access authorisation and 
maintenance. 
 
Smartphone physical access authorisation and maintenance procedures have 
been defined and implemented.  
51 ME2 Monitor and control IT internal control activities. 
 
Smartphone internal control activities are monitored and controlled. 
52 ME2 Monitor the self-assessment process. 
 
Smartphone self-assessment processes exist and are monitored. 
53 ME2 Monitor the performance of independent reviews, audits and examinations. 
 
Independent smartphone reviews, audits and examinations are monitored. 
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54 ME2 Monitor the process to obtain assurance over controls operated by third parties. 
 
The process of obtaining assurance over smartphone controls operated by third 
parties is monitored. 
55 ME2 Monitor the process to identify and assess control exceptions. 
 
The process to identify and assess smartphone control exceptions is monitored. 
56 ME2 Monitor the process to identify and remediate control exceptions. 
 
The process to identify and remediate smartphone control exceptions is being 
monitored. 
57 ME2 Report to key stakeholders. 
 
The role of smartphones is reported to key stakeholders.  
58 ME3 Define and execute a process to identify legal, contractual, policy and regulatory 
requirements. 
 
The process to identify legal, contractual, policy and regulatory requirements of 
smartphones, has been defined and executed. 
59 ME3 Evaluate compliance of IT activities with IT policies, plans and procedures. 
 
Smartphone activities are evaluated for compliance with IT policies, plans and 
procedures. 
60 ME3 Report positive assurance of compliance of IT activities with IT policies, plans and 
procedures. 
 
Positive assurance of smartphone compliance of IT activities, with IT policies, 
plans and procedures is reported. 
61 ME3 Provide input to align IT policies, plans and procedures in response to compliance 
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requirements. 
 
Input is provided to align smartphone policies, plans and procedures in response 
to compliance requirements. 
62 ME3 Integrate IT reporting on regulatory requirements with similar output from other 
business functions. 
 
Smartphone reporting on regulatory requirements with similar output from other 
business functions is integrated. 
63 ME5 Establish executive and board oversight and facilitation over IT activities. 
 
Executive and board oversight, and facilitation over smartphone activities, is 
established. 
64 ME5 Review, endorse, align and communicate IT performance, IT strategy, and resource 
and risk management with business strategy. 
 
Smartphone performance, smartphone strategy and smartphone resource and 
risk management is reviewed, endorsed, aligned and communicated with business 
strategy. 
65 ME5 Obtain periodic independent assessment of performance and compliance with 
policies, plans and procedures. 
 
Independent assessment of smartphone performance and compliance with 
policies, plans and procedures is periodically obtained. 
66 ME5 Resolve findings of independent assessments, and ensure management's 
implementation of agreed-upon recommendations. 
 
Independent smartphone assessments are resolved, and management implement 
agreed upon recommendations. 
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67 ME5 Generate an IT governance report. 
 
An IT governance report has been generated and includes feedback on the 
performance of smartphones. 
Omitted questions below 
68 DS12 Select and commission the site (data center, office, etc.). 
69 DS12 Manage the physical environment (maintaining, monitoring and reporting included). 
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Appendix B – Response scores by 
question (Rounded) 
Question All Respondents Responsible for security 
requirements 
Not Responsible for 
security requirements 
1 0.86 0.89 0.85 
2 1.10 1.44 0.95 
3 1.24 1.67 1.05 
4 1.31 1.33 1.30 
5 0.97 1.00 0.95 
6 1.14 1.22 1.10 
7 0.93 0.89 0.95 
8 1.00 1.00 1.00 
9 0.90 1.22 0.75 
10 1.07 2.11 0.60 
11 1.10 1.67 0.85 
12 0.86 0.78 0.90 
13 1.07 1.22 1.00 
14 1.14 1.78 0.85 
15 0.93 1.33 0.75 
16 0.86 1.00 0.80 
17 0.62 0.89 0.50 
18 0.79 1.00 0.70 
19 0.52 0.67 0.45 
20 0.62 0.33 0.75 
21 0.62 0.44 0.70 
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22 0.48 0.33 0.55 
23 0.55 0.33 0.65 
24 0.55 0.33 0.65 
25 1.10 1.22 1.05 
26 1.10 1.44 0.95 
27 0.83 1.00 0.75 
28 0.55 0.56 0.55 
29 0.55 1.00 0.35 
30 0.55 0.56 0.55 
31 0.62 0.78 0.55 
32 0.59 0.67 0.55 
33 0.62 0.44 0.70 
34 1.14 1.44 1.00 
35 0.52 0.78 0.40 
36 0.86 1.00 0.80 
37 0.76 1.00 0.65 
38 0.76 0.78 0.75 
39 0.90 0.67 1.00 
40 0.79 0.89 0.75 
41 1.00 1.22 0.90 
42 0.97 1.11 0.90 
43 0.86 1.33 0.65 
44 0.55 0.44 0.60 
45 0.83 1.11 0.70 
46 1.07 1.67 0.80 
47 1.03 1.56 0.80 
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48 0.86 1.22 0.70 
49 0.90 1.11 0.80 
50 0.97 1.44 0.75 
51 0.69 1.11 0.50 
52 0.41 0.56 0.35 
53 0.38 0.78 0.20 
54 0.28 0.56 0.15 
55 0.52 0.44 0.55 
56 0.34 0.56 0.25 
57 0.79 1.22 0.60 
58 0.93 0.89 0.95 
59 1.00 1.22 0.90 
60 0.83 1.00 0.75 
61 0.76 1.00 0.65 
62 0.76 1.00 0.65 
63 0.62 0.78 0.55 
64 0.97 1.33 0.80 
65 0.45 0.56 0.40 
66 0.45 0.44 0.45 
67 0.83 0.56 0.95 
 
 
